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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICTS-IN

THE ABSENCE OF FEDERAL CONFLICT OF LAWS

RULE IN DIVERSITY CASES DISTRICT COURT MUST APPLY THE STATE'S
CHOICE OF LAW RULE

Plaintiffs,' an American serviceman from Wisconsin and survivors of an American serviceman from Tennessee, sought damages
in this diversity action 2 against defendant munitions manufacturing corporation 3 for personal injuries and death resulting from the
premature explosion of a howitzer round in Cambodia. Plaintiffs
alleged that the injuries were caused by the defective manufacture
of the shell, for which the defendant should be liable under the
strict liability rules of Texas, the forum and the place of the shell's
manufacture.' The District Court of the Eastern District of Texas
adopted the plaintiff's position on choice of law and the jury
awarded damages. Before the Circuit Court of Appeals, defendants
objected to the district court's application of Texas substantive
law and argued that the conflict of laws rules of the Texas forum
must be applied; under Texas conflict of laws rules, the law of the
place of injury, Cambodia, would apply.5 On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, held, affirmed. When
application of the forum's conflict of laws rule would result in the
use of a law of a jurisdiction that has no interest in the controversy, a federal choice of law rule exists which would apply the
substantive law of the interested forum. On writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, vacated and remanded. The
1. Plaintiff Hawley K. Challoner of Wisconsin was severely injured by the
explosion; plaintiff Daniel E. Nelms of Tennessee was killed. At the time of the
explosion, both were members of the United States Army engaged in combat with
the North Vietnamese.
2. Diversity jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
3. Defendant Day and Zimmerman is incorporated in Maryland and has its
principal place of business in Pennsylvania.
4. Plaintiffs presented expert testimony that a cavitation in the explosive

material probably caused its detonation before the shell had traveled the length
of the gun tube, that all required safety precautions had been followed, and that
government reports showed that tests performed on the remainder of the ammunition in the same lot as the round which exploded found defects. Defendants
contended that the ammunition was manufactured in accordance with government design and monitored by government inspection systems, and that any
defect would have been insufficient to cause a premature explosion. Therefore the
defendent contended it should not be held strictly liable.
5. 512 F.2d 77 at 79-80.
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district court must apply the state choice of law rule in the absence
of a federal choice of law rule in diversity cases. Challoner v. Day
and Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (1975), cert. granted, vacated
and remanded, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
The Supreme Court seemingly decided the question of whether
there should be a federal conflict of laws rule for diversity cases in
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, which held that a federal court, sitting
in diversity, must apply the law of the state in which it sits.' The
Court based its holding on an interpretation of section 34 of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 17891 which indicated that state law
should apply when the Constitution, statutes, or treaties did not
require the application of federal law. This deferral to state law
was applied to the conflict of laws rules in Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., Inc. ,8 in which the Supreme Court cited
Erie and admonished the lower federal courts to apply the forum's
choice of law rule and to avoid their own "independent determinations." 9 However, Erie and Klaxon left the federal judiciary free to
create federal common law in cases which did not involve diversity
of citizenship and where federal interests predominated.' 0 The pol6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1970):
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or

statutes otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.
8. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
9. 313 U.S. at 496.
10. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405, 407 (1964); Maier, The Three Facesof Zapata:Maritime
Law, Federal Common Law, Federal Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 38798 (1973); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 657, 66774 (1959).
Examples of areas into which the federal judiciary extended federal common
law were: (1) to protect federal regulatory agencies and thus provide national
uniformity in cases which involved them [Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1952)]; (2) to promote national
use of arbitration [Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388
U.S. 395 (1967)]; (3) to provide for recovery for marine wrongful death at shoreline [Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970)]; (4) to honor
choice of forum clauses in foreign contracts [The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Oil Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)]; and (5) to provide a federal means for solving state
boundary disputes [Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965); Hinderlinder v.
La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1937)]; Maier,
Coordinationof Law in a NationalFederalState: An Analysis of the Writings of
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icy of an overriding national interest in the uniform resolution of
problems involving international affairs has resulted in the application of federal common law in areas of international concern."
Commentators have often cited similar policy reasons for a federal
conflicts rule in diversity cases.' 2 Conflicts writers can be grouped
according to their theories on the relative state and federal interests involved in an interstate conflict. There are those who advocate a "vested rights" theory, 13 whereby the laws of a given political subdivision control rights and duties that arise from legally
significant events within the territory of the subdivision (e.g.,

tortious conduct). Others advocate a "local law" theory' 4 under
which a forum uses the results of previous conflicts cases to determine what result would be consistent. The forum is free to decide

conflicts cases as it wishes, and is also free to adopt legal rules of
a foreign state. Another group favors coordination of state and
federal law by forcing the use of the law of the political subdivision whose policies most greatly affect the problem under consideration.'5 There is no concensus among commentators on the
federal conflict of laws question, but the literature suggests the
importance of the problem. The courts have dealt with the possible creation of a federal conflict of laws rule through a strict
Elliott Evans Cheatham, 26 VAND. L. REV. 207, 224 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Maier].
11. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (invalidation of a state escheat
statute for its treatment of resident aliens); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (criticism of a foreign nation's action under the Act of
State Doctrine).
12. It should be noted that in the field of conflict of laws, often writers and
law review articles are more abundant than cases. Few conflicts cases are heard
by the higher level courts, creating a dearth of precedent and also of judges who
can ably deal with conflicts issues. In the last fifty years, this field has undergone
major changes, which were reflected in the writers long before they were evidenced in the courts.
13. Maier, supra note 10, at 213. The first group included primarily Professor
Joseph Henry Beale, the Reporter of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
See 6 ALI PROCEEDINGS 463-64 (1927-28).
14. The second group's primary proponent was Professor W. Cook. See COOK,
THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); Maier, supra note
10, at 214; VON

MEHREN

&

TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS

52-55

(1965).
15. The third group's chief advocate was Professor Elliott Cheatham. See
Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions, 25 ARK.
L. REV. 9, 9-11 (1971); Cheatham, Some Developments in Conflict of Laws, 17
VAND.L. REV. 193 (1963); see also Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 489, 509 (1954).
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application of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution,
which requires the application of a sister state's law notwithstanding any conflict with the forum state's law or policies. The
courts that adhere to the Klaxon approach and apply forum state
choice of law rules find that the controlling constitutional requirement is due process and judge the foreign state's choice of law
rules by that standard. 6 In the 1930's the Court discouraged
development of a federal conflict of laws rule when it found in
two workmen's compensation cases that the forum state's
choice of law rule did not violate due process and denied that
full faith and credit required the use of a foreign state's statute
within the forum when the -forum had the predominant interest. 7
This view was radically changed by the Court's decision in
Hughes v. Fetter.8 In that case the Court required the Wisconsin
forum to entertain a wrongful death action for the death of a
Wisconsin resident in Illinois under the appropriate Illinois statute, in spite of a Wisconsin statute that created a cause of
action for wrongful death only when the death occurred in Wisconsin. The Court based its decision on the application of the full faith
and credit clause to sister state statutes as well as judgments. 9
After Hughes, the power of the federal courts to determine which
state interest to apply in order to protect the expectations of the
parties seemed fixed. As an example, the Court used the full faith
and credit clause in First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air
Lines to invalidate an Illinois state statute that excluded an
action for wrongful death of an Illinois resident outside Illinois if
the action could have been brought in the state in which the death
occurred. Thus, the Court refused to apply a state choice of law
rule that it felt violated the full faith and credit clause. However,
the Court, in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., severely limited the
16. U.S. CONST., art. IV, cl. 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
state to the public Acts, Records, and judicial proceedings of every other State."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .

. . ."; supra note

8.

17. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of California, 294
U.S. 532 (1935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939). See-Note, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1946).

18.

341 U.S. 609 (1951). Maier, supra note 10, at 236.

19. Some commentators have suggested that the proper basis for the Hughes
decision was on equal protection grounds, because the Wisconsin statute discriminated unreasonably between Wisconsin citizens killed in Wisconsin and those
killed in other states. Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of

Action, 73 HARV. L. REv. 36, 268 (1959).
20. 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
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use of the full faith and credit clause as a federal choice of law
rule. 2 ' Altlough the Pennsylvania forum was required to entertain
a wrongful death action under the Alabama statute where an Alabama resident was killed by a defective wheel manufactured in
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court allowed the Pennsylvania court
to bar the action under its one-year statute of limitation for wrongful death, in spite of Alabama's two-year limit. Thus, the Court
indicated that the full faith and credit clause would prevent any
arbitrary discrimination against out-of-state causes of action. Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, noted that, ironically, the
lack of uniformity in this case was exactly what Erie sought to
correct. 22 The Court further extended this limiting view of the
Hughes doctrine in Carroll v. Lanza when a suit for common law
damages under Arkansas law for an Arkansas injury was allowed
although the worker had an exclusive Missouri workmen's compensation remedy under which he had been receiving benefits. The
Court found that Arkansas, as the place of injury, had sufficient
contact to apply its own law without being compelled under the
full faith and credit clause to apply Missouri law and without
violating due process. Practically, therefore, states today are free
to choose their own choice of law rules in the absence of a federal
conflict of laws rule within the bounds of due process. The requirement that full faith and credit must be given is applicable
only in isolated cases in which a decision not to give full faith and
credit would be arbitrary.24
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the District Court's
determination that Texas substantive law should apply, in spite
of the traditional conflicts rule which would apply the state choice
of law rule .25 Under Texas choice of law principles, Cambodian law
would then apply. 26 The court relied on a previous Fifth Circuit
decision, Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 27 which applied a federal
21. 345 U.S. 514 (1953). Maier, supra note 10, at 238.
22. 345 U.S. at 519 (1953). The lack of uniformity between actions in state and
federal court within the state was the concern in Erie. Supra note 6.
23. 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Maier, supra note 10, at 259.

24. Supra note 16; see Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); N.Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
25. Erie v. Tompkins, supra note 6; Klaxon v. Stentor, supra note 8; Friendly,
supra note 10.

26. TEX. ANN. STAT. tit. 77, art. 4678 (1975); supra note 5.
27. Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884, 888 (1970), cert. den., 402 U.S.
909 (1970). In Lester, the court applied Louisiana law to protect the insured
Louisiana resident by requiring that the Louisiana law regarding notice and can-
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choice of law rule that prohibited the application of the law of a
jurisdiction that had "no interest" in the case. The court also
noted that the application of Texas substantive law would satisfy
the substantial interests of the four American states involved, i.e.
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Tennessee.Y All four jurisdictions are strict liability states for commercial tort cases; thus,
no interested American jurisdiction would have its policy "frustrated" by the application of Texas law.2 9 The court mentioned the
interest of the United States in the compensation of injured serv-

icemen and noted that American citizens would not want their
servicemen governed by any lower standard of care than that standard applied by the soldier's home state." The court recognized no
Cambodian interest in this case.3 Turning to a consideration of
traditional principles of international law, the court viewed Cambodia as having given up its traditional exclusive jurisdiction over
its own territory because Cambodia allowed foreign troops on her
soil. " The court also cited the traditional rule that no nation can
assume jurisdiction over non-residents.13 Finally, the court stated
that, as an American tribunal, applying American law, it found no
reason to "frustrate" United States policy by applying Cambodian
law. 4 Having decided on the application of Texas substantive law,
the court then determined that the major issues of Texas substantive law were applied correctly by the district court and found the
cellation of insurance policies be applied to allow recovery against the insurer,
instead of denying recovery under the less stringent Wisconsin rule, which was
the place of issuance of the policy. The court determined that the Klaxon principle was inapplicable because of what the court called a "false conflict" situation,
defined as the situation occurring "when one of the two states related to a case
has a legitimate interest in the application of its law and policy and the other has
none."
28. Supra notes 1, 3.
29. 512 F.2d at 80; Howes v. Hanson, 56 Wisc.2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972);
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); Hoffman v. A.B.
Chance Co., 346 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440
S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
30. 512 F.2d at 80.
31. 512 F.2d at 80. The court stated: "The Cambodian requirement that fault

be proven is a policy designed to afford a high degree of protection to Cambodian
manufacturers; Cambodia is indifferent to the protection of American manufacturers."
32. 512 F.2d at 81; The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 7 Cranch 116, 137,
3 L. Ed. 287 (1812); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19-20 (2d
ed. 1841) [hereinafter cited as STORY].
33. 512 F.2d at 81; STORY, supra note 32, W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 43940 (2d ed. 1962).

34. 512 F.2d at 82.
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defendant. corporation liable for the death and injuries caused by
35
the defective shell.
The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals use of a
federal conflict of laws rule. The Court upheld the use of the estab-

lished state conflict of laws rule as required by Klaxon, and remanded the case to the district court for application of the Texas
choice of law rule.3 6 The per curiam opinion rejected both the lower
court's reliance on Lester v. Aetna Life ins. Co.," and the lower
court's contention that the traditional conflict rule should not
apply to a federal court dealing with American soldiers injured in
a foreign country. 3 The Court stated that the circuit court misinterpreted Klaxon or "determined for itself that it was no longer of
controlling force . . ",31 The Court emphasized the need for the
application of the same law whether the suit was brought in state
or federal court.0 The Court thus saw no reason to reverse the
traditional application of state conflict of laws rules in federal
diversity cases."
This case presented the district and circuit courts with the problem of how to maneuver the forum's conflict of laws rules in order
to apply Texas law to an injury caused by a defective product
manufactured in Texas when the injury occurred on foreign soil.
On a policy basis, the lower courts did make the more equitable
decision in applying Texas law.2 Viewed under one commentator's
test, both lower courts were applying the law that would give the
most predictable and uniform results, maintain international and
35. The six major issues under Texas substantive law were: (1) whether trans-

action was commercial; (2) whether jury could find defendants liable if the product was defectively designed; (3)whether round was defective when it left defendant's hands; (4) whether to admit governmental test reports on the shell; (5)
whether public policy demands strict liability with costs of injuries from defective

manufacture accruing to manufacturing corporation; and (6) whether Texas
wrongful death statute applied extraterritorially.
36. 96 S.Ct. 167 at 168; Klaxon, supra note 8.
37. Supra note 27.
38. 96 S.Ct. at 168; Lester, supra note 27.
39. 96 S.Ct. at 168.
40. Justice Blackman in a concurring opinion added that he does not interpret
the majority opinion to "compel" the determination that it was only the law of
Cambodia that is applicable. On remand he felt that the Court of Appeals could
hold that Texas state courts would apply the Texas rule of strict liability.
41. 96 S.Ct. at 168.
42. Some policies traditionally examined include: most beneficial compensation to victims; possible deterrance to future manufacturers; and state interest
in the safety of products manufactured within its borders.
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interstate order, simplify the judicial task, advance the forum's
interest, and apply the better rule of law." These policies, however,
were not articulated by the courts in the instant case. Also, the
application of Texas law would fulfill the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws."
The adoption of a federal choice of law rule would further the
above-mentioned policies and free the federal courts from the need
to apply automatically the law of an uninterested forum, and to
follow blindly the Erie-Klaxon line of cases. Indeed, some writers
feel that the creation of a national conflict of laws rule would not
contradict Erie; to the contrary, those authors believe that Erie,
far from doing away with federal common law, may have freed this
interstitial body of law to "develop naturally in those areas in
which national interests predominate.""' Such national interests
are found in Challoner:the injured men were American servicemen
engaged in combat for the United States; the product that caused
the injury had been manufactured according to government specifications and safety regulations; the injury occurred in a foreign
country." As Professor Jessup ably pointed out, the Erie Doctrine
should not apply in the field of foreign relations because conducting international affairs is a federal prerogative and the states of
the union generally do not participate in international affairs.4 7
Neither court discussed the predominance of the federal government over the state in international affairs in their opinions; a
federal choice of law rule would establish needed guidelines in this
area." It should be noted that a federal conflict of laws rule is not
called for by all writers. Some writers feel that the difficulties in
43. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 267, 282 (1966), quoted in Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law Choice
of Law, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 1191, 1192 (1967); see also Baxter, Choice of Law
and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969). The section

states that the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship
to the issue would apply as established by contacts specified (place of injury,
domicile, and nationality of parties, place of conduct which caused the injury,
and place where relationship between the parties is centered).
45. Maier, supra note 10, at 22.
46. 512 F.2d 80 at n.2.
47. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to
InternationalLaw, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743 (1939).
48. One example of on going work in the federal conflict of law area is the
upcoming Private International Law Convention on Products Liability being prepared by John W. Wade, reporter (not yet published).
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the area stem from the very existence of conflicts rules." However,
most authors agree that the need for resolution of the federal conflict of laws issue is great in the modem shrinking world. Because
of the desire for predictability, uniformity, preservation of expectations of parties, simplicity of the judicial task, and protection of
federal interests, a national conflict of laws rule is necessary in a
commercial tort case where the injury occurs on foreign soil.5
Challoner does not solve this problem; however, the decision dramatically illustrates the need for the Supreme Court to adopt a
federal conflict of laws rule.
Susan Alexander Shands
49. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 8 DUKE
L.J. 171 (1959), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 117, 18384 (1963).
50.

See D. CAVER S, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965).

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-MIGRANT WORKERS-EXCLUSION
OF ALIENS-A MEMBER STATE MAY LIMIT FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SECURITY, OR HEALTH IN
THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION UNDER ARTICLE 48 AND ARTICLE 3(1) OF
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE No. 64/221

The Church of Scientology, established in the United States,
functions in the United Kingdom through a college at East Grinstead, Sussex. Although no legal restrictions are placed upon the
practice of Scientology in the United Kingdom or upon British
nationals wishing to become members of or take employment with
the Church of Scientology, the British Government regards the
activities of the Church as contrary to public policy.' Petitioner, a
Dutch national, was offered employment as a secretary with the

Church of Scientology at its college in the United Kingdom. Intending to accept that offer, she arrived at Gatwick Airport in May
1973 but was refused leave to enter by an immigration officer who
acted in accordance with government policy and with rule 65 of the
Immigration Rules for Control of Entry.' Petitioner sought a declaration in the English High Court, Chancery Division, that she be
entitled to enter and remain in the United Kingdom to accept
employment with the Church of Scientology. In asserting that the
refusal of leave to enter was unlawful, petitioner relied on the rules
of freedom of movement for workers established by the European
Community, specifically article 48 of the European Economic
Community Treaty, 3 Council Regulation 1612/68,1 and article 3 of
1. In a speech before the House of Commons on July 25, 1968, the Minister of
Health declared Scientology to be a socially harmful "pseudo-philosophical cult."
769 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 189 (1968).
2. The power to refuse entry into the United Kingdom is vested in
immigration officers by virtue of section 4(1) of the Immigration Act of 1971, c.77.
Rule 65 of the Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry, 1973, House
of Commons Paper 81, provides:
Any passenger except the wife or child under 18 of a person settled in the
U.K. may be refused leave to enter on the ground that the exclusion is
conducive to the public good where-(a) the Secretary of State has personally so directed, or (b) from information available to the Immigration Officer it seems right to refuse leave to enter on that ground-if for example,
in the light of the passenger's character, conduct or associations it is undesirable to give him leave to enter.
3. Treaty Establishing the European Community (EEC), March 25, 1957,
article 48 provides:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by the end of the transitional period at the latest.
2. Such freedom of movement for workers shall entail the abolition of any
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Council Directive No. 64/221.1 The Home Office asserted in the
Chancery Division that neither article 48 nor Directive 64/221 were
directly applicable so as to confer rights on foreign workers enforceable by them in English courts6 and emphasized that refusal of
leave to enter was based exclusively on the personal conduct of
petitioner within the meaning of article 3(1) of Council Directive
No. 64/221.1 The Vice-Chancellor of the High Court stayed the
proceedings and referred three questions 8 to the Court of Justice
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States
as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and
employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of
public policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this
purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in
accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that state laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been
employed in that State subject to conditions which shall be embodied
in implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this article shall not apply to employment in the
public service.
The authoritative English text of the EEC Treaty may be found in TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Office for Official Publications of the

European Communities, 1973). An unofficial English text may be found in 298
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
4. Council Regulation No. 1612/68 of October 19, 1968, established the provisions governing the free movement of workers within the Community. [1968]
Official Journal of the European Communities 1 [hereinafter cited as O.J.].
5. Article 3(1) of Council Directive No. 64/221 of February 25, 1964, provides: "Measures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be
based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned." [1964]
O.J. 850.
6. The Chancery Division case is reported at, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 13
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 347 (1974).
7. 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 354.
8. The Court of Justice was requested to give a preliminary ruling on the
following questions:
1. Whether article 48 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community is directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the court[s] of a Member State;
2.

Whether Directive No. 64/221

. .

. is directly applicable so as to confer

on individuals rights enforceable by them in the courts of a Member State;

3. Whether upon the proper interpretation of article 48. .. and article 3
of Directive No. 64/221 a Member State in the performance of its duty to
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of the European Community pursuant to article 177.1 The Court
of Justice ruled that article 48(3) of the EEC Treaty and article
3(1) of Council Directive No. 64/221 were directly applicable, conferring rights on individuals which would be enforceable by them
in the courts of Member States. The Court, held, that present
membership of and participation in the activities of a socially undesirable organization may constitute "personal conduct" within
the meaning of the Council's Directive and that such conduct
need not be tainted with illegality before a Member State may
exercise its discretionary power under article 48(3) by refusing a
Community national entry into its country. Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] E.C.R. 178, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8283, 15
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (1975).
base a measure taken on grounds of public policy exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned is entitled to take into account
as matters of personal conduct (a) the fact that the individual is or has
been associated with some body or an organization the activities of which
the Member State considers contrary to the public good but which are not
unlawful in that State; (b) the fact that the individual intends to take up
employment in the Member State with such a body or organization, it being
the case that no restrictions are placed upon nationals of the Member State
who wish to take similar employment with such a body or organization.
Van Duyn v. Home Office, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8283, at 7221-22, 15 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 15 (1975).
9. The European Community was enlarged through the accession of the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark on January 1, 1973. The High Court of
London, Chancery Division, referred to the Court of Justice pursuant to EEC
article 177 which provides:

The Court of Justice shall be competent to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter
before the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
For a case analysis of the Court's interpretationof its powers under article 177 see
Woodworth, The Court of Justiceof the EuropeanCommunities: The Request for
a PreliminaryRuling and the Protectionof Individual Rights Under Article 177
of the Treaty of Rome, 18 SYR. L. REv. 602 (1967).
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Over the years the Court of Justice has developed criteria for
determining whether a provision set out in the EEC Treaty is
directly applicable so as to confer upon individuals rights enforceable by them in national courts. These criteria include: (1) the
provision must impose a clear and precise obligation on Member
States; (2) it must be unconditional or, if a provision is subject to
limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation or qualification
must be clearly defined; and (3) Member States must not be left
any real discretion with regard to the application of the rule in
question." The proposition that the provisions of article 48 establishing freedom of movement within the Community for employed
persons satisfy the criteria noted above is no longer subject to
question in light of the recent decision in Commission v. France,,"
in which the Court said that since article 48 is directly applicable
in the legal system of every Member State and because
Community law has priority over national law, national authori2
ties must respect and safeguard the rights of migrant workers.
Article 189's draws a distinction between: (1) regulations, which
10. See International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit,
18 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour (Cour de Justice de la Communaute
Europeenne) 1219 [hereinafter cited as Recueil], 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8194
(1972) (interpreting article 177); Firma Carl Schluter v. Hauptzollamt, [1973]
E.C.R. 1135, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8233 (interpreting articles 5 and 107 on

the establishment in stages of an economic and monetary union within the Community); Reyners v. Belgium, [19741 E.C.R. 631, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1
8256, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 305 (regarding article 52 on the right of
establishment).
11. Commission v. France, [1974] E.C.R. 359, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8270, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216. In that case, article 3(2) of the French Code du
Travail Maritime provided that the crew of a ship must, in a ratio laid down by
an order of the Minister of Merchant Marine, be of French nationality. The Court
of Justice held the provision invalid under EEC article 48 and article 4 of Council
Regulation No. 1612/68 of October 15, 1968. [1968] O.J. 2.
12. For a discussion of article 48 (workers and the EEC) see A. PARRY & S.
HARDY, EEC LAW ch. 23 (1973).
13. EEC article 189 provides:
The Council and the Commission shall, in the discharge of their duties
and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, issue regulations and
directives, take decisions and formulate recommendations or opinions.
Regulations shall have general application. They shall be binding in every
respect and directly applicable in each Member State.
Directives shall be binding in respect of the result to be achieved, upon
every Member State, but the form and manner of enforcing them shall be
a matter for the national authorities.Decisions shall be binding in every
respect upon those to whom they are directed.
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are rules promulgated when a uniform solution is needed for all
Member States and which have the effect of national law; (2)
directives, which do not have the force of directly binding law, but
rather set goals for all, some, or a single Member State and obli-

gates the State to prescribe the manner and means of execution;
(3) decisions, which, unlike regulations, do not have general application, but are binding only upon those to whom they are addressed; and (4) recommendations and opinions, which are not
legally binding. Because of these fine distinctions, there exists uncertainty regarding the direct applicability of Council Directives-in the instant case, the Council Directive of February 25,
1964, No. 64/221, article 3(1).,4 The framework for establishing the
direct applicability of directives, however, has been built by several prior Court decisions. In Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein,'5 the
Court held that article 189 measures other than regulations could
have direct applicability, particularly when Community organs
have imposed upon Member States the duty to adopt a certain
mode of conduct. The Court reasoned that the value of Community
measures would be lessened were nationals of Member States unable to invoke them in national courts and if the courts themselves
could not take them into consideration as part of Community
law.' 6 In S.A. C.E. v. ItalianMinistry of Finance'7 the Court clearly
interpreted the nature and scope of directives, holding that they
can be directly applicable. The question left for the Court in the
instant case was to determine whether Member States under article 48 and article 3 of Council Directive No. 64/221 could take into
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. (Emphasis
added).
14. See note 5 supra.

15. Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 18 Recueil 825, 10 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 1 (1971).
16. The Court stated, "It is true that by article 189 regulations are directly

applicable and may therefore certainly produce direct effects by virtue of their
nature as law. However, it does not follow from this that other categories of legal
measures mentioned in that article could never produce similar effects." 10
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 23.
17. "Directive 68/131, the purpose of which was to impose on a Member State
a final date for the performance of a Community obligation, not only affects the
relations between the Commission and that State but also entails legal consequences which may be invoked both by other Member States which are interested
in its execution and by individuals whenever by its nature the provision establishing this obligation is directly applicable ...

MKT. REP.

."

16 Recueil 1213, 2 CCH ComM.

8117, at 7316, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 123, 133 (1971).

.120

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9.415

account, as matters of "personal conduct," present or past associations with an organization considered by the Member State to be
contrary to the public good, despite the fact that no similar restrictions applied to nationals of the State. The issue of limitations
imposed by considerations of public policy and public security
upon the principle of freedom of movement for workers within the

Community as set forth in article 4818 had not been previously
addressed by the Court.
Three questions were referred to the Court of Justice by the
English High Court. 9 To the question of the direct applicability
of article 48, the Court replied in the affirmative, holding that
article 48(1) and (2) leave Member States no discretionary power
with regard to implementation. Although article 48(3) authorizes
limitations on the free movement of workers when justified by
public policy, public security, or public health considerations, the
Court reasoned that these limitations were subject to judicial scrutiny to insure that a Member State's right to invoke the limitations
would not thwart the purpose of article 48-the preservation of free
movement for workers within the Community. The Court next
rejected the argument of the Home Office that the distinction
between regulations, directives, and decisions raises a presumption
that by issuing a directive, the Council necessarily intended that
it not be directly applicable. Such an interpretation, the Court
reasoned, would be incompatible with articles 189 and 177 because
the net effect would be to prevent individuals from relying on
Community Acts before their national courts. Specifically limiting
its interpretation to article 3(1), the Court did not rule on the
direct applicability of all articles of Directive No. 64/221.20
Nevertheless, the Court held that article 3(1), requiring that measures restricting free movement of workers be made on public policy grounds and be based on the individual's personal conduct, is
18. See note 3 supra.
19. See note 8 supra.
20. The Court explained why it chose to limit its interpretation as follows:
"According to the order making the referral, the only provision of the Directive
that is relevant is the one contained in article 3(1), which provides that 'measures
taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall be based exclusively on
the personal conduct of the individual concerned.'" 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. T
8283, at 7226, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 15 (1975). Moreover, the Court said, "It is
necessary to examine, in every case, whether the nature, general scheme and
wording of the provision in question are capable of having direct effect on the
relation between Member States and individuals." 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8283, at 7227, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 16 (1975).
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directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable
by them in the courts of Member States. In addressing the question of whether a Member State may consider an individual's present or past associations, the Court first considered whether association with a body or an organization in itself constitutes "personal conduct" within the meaning of article 3(1) of Directive No.
64/221. The Court held that although an individual's past associations cannot justify a restriction upon his freedom of movement
within the Community, present association can. The Court defined
"present association" as either participation in an organization's

activities or identification with its aims," and held that Petitioner's association with the Church of Scientology constituted
''personal conduct" within the meaning of the Council's Directive.
The Court next probed the issue of whether a Member State is
entitled on public policy grounds to prevent a national of another
Member State from taking employment with an organization in its
territory, when no similar restrictions exist for its own nationals.
Once more, the Court strictly interpreted article 48 and article 3(1)
of Directive No. 64/221 as being subject to limitations justified
solely on grounds of public policy, security, or health. Member
States cannot reasonably be required to make objectionable
activities illegal to justify a measure restricting free movement."
The Court easily discarded notions of ipso facto discrimination by
a Member State which refuses entry to nationals of another Member State and not its own, relying on the general principle of international law that a state is precluded from refusing right of entry
and residence to its own nationals.2 3 While the Court admitted
concepts of "public policy" would differ from Member State to
Member State,24 it did not believe the imposition of a Community
21. 2 CCH COMM.
(1975).
22. 2 CCH COMM.

MKT.

REP.

8283, at 7227, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 17

MKT.

REP.

8283, at 7227, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 17

(1975).

23. In this instance, the Court accepted the rationale of the United Kingdom:
"A state has a duty under international law to receive back its own nationals. The
United Kingdom refers inter alia to Article [13(2)] of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights, which states: 'Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.'" 2 CCH COMM. MKT.
8283, at 7225 (1975).
24.

REP.

In the words of the Court:

Nevertheless, the particular circumstances justifying recourse to the concept of public policy may vary from one country to another and from one
period to another, and it is therefore necessary in this matter to allow the
competent national authorities an area of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty.
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public policy concept would be either feasible or advisable, preferring instead to allow national authorities a measure of discretion
within the confines of the Treaty.
This decision marks an important milestone in the history of the
Court of Justice and of the European Community because it is the
first case referred by a British Court to the Court of Justice. This
is also the first time the Court has been called upon to interpret
the limitations set forth in article 48 on the principle of free movement of workers within the Community imposed by national standards of public policy, public health, and public security. The

Court of Justice was faced with the precarious task of reconciling
the power of Member States to determine national public policy
concepts with the need for a uniform application of Community
law and, specifically, with the Treaty principle of nondiscrimination between migrant and national workers. The Court of Justice has now ruled consistently with its judgments in Reyners v.
Belgium and Commission v. France5 that provisions of article 48
are directly enforceable in national courts. Additionally, the Court
has specifically held that article 3(1) of Council Directive No.
64/221 is directly enforceable in national courts of Member States.
The essential element of article 3(1) is that any restriction on
workers' movement on grounds of public policy or security shall be
based exclusively on the "personal conduct" of the individual concerned. In its opinion, the Court has interpreted "personal conduct" within the meaning of Community law.28 The Court has
pragmatically preserved the power of Member States to determine
national concepts of public policy and security rather than imposing any single Community standard. Recognizing that circumstances justifying concepts of public policy differ not only from
Member State to Member State, but over time within each state,
2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8283, at 7227, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 17 (1975).
25. Reyners v. Belgium, [1974] E.C.R. 631, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8256,
14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 305 (1974); Commission v. France, [1974] E.C.R. 359, 2
CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8270, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216 (1974).

26. See note 21 supra. In a recent subsequent decision the Court, citing Van
Duyn v. Home Office, held that the concept of "personal conduct" in article 3 of
Council Directive No. 64/221 expressed the requirement that a deportation order

relating to persons covered by article 48, may only be made for breaches of the
peace, public security, etc., which might be committed by the individual affected.
The deportation order issued by the national authorities for the purpose of deterring other aliens, i.e. of a general preventative nature, was struck down by the
Court of Justice. Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektor, [1975] E.C.R. -,
2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
8298, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 472 (1975).
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the Court has attempted to maintain the flexibility and adaptability of Community law. The Court has not only preserved the spirit
of the EEC Treaty but has strengthened Community law by ruling
that justifications of restrictions on free worker movement by national authorities will be subject to review by Community organs.2"
As a result of the instant case, it is likely that there will be future
referrals to the Court of Justice by the national courts of the
United Kingdom and the other newly admitted states, Ireland and
Denmark. It is clear that the scope of the Court's authority and its
interpretation of directly applicable provisions of the EEC Treaty2
have given the Court a central role as a unifying force in the Community system, assuring both a uniform and an authoritative reso-

lution of questions of Community law.
Susan L. Blankenheimer
27. In the words of the Court:
It should be emphasized that the concept of public policy in the context of
the Community and where, in particular, it is used as a justification for
derogating from the fundamental principle of freedom of movement for
workers, must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without being subject to review
by the institutions of the Community.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8283, at 7227, 15 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 17 (1975)
(emphasis added).
28. For analysis and commentary on the supremacy of Community law over
national law viewed from the standpoint of direct applicability as the critical
factor in determining supremacy see Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisions of
Community Law: The Development of a Community Concept, 18 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 257 (1970). For a recent study of jurisdiction and procedure of the Court of
Justice see Note, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 674 (1975). See also Hay & Thompson,
The Community Court and Supremacy of Community Law: A ProgressReport,
8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 652 (1975).

IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE-STATE

PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES
CAN BE ASSESSED UPON GOODS ARRIVING AT A DISTRIBUTION WAREHOUSE, THAT HAVE BEEN UNLOADED FROM THEIR IMPORTING
CONTAINERS, SORTED, AND STORED WITH OTHER GOODS

Plaintiff, an importer and domestic distributor of tires and
tubes,' brought an action to enjoin defendant, the Georgia State
Tax Commissioner, from collecting an ad valorem tax against
plaintiff's inventory of tires and tubes held in his warehouse. When
defendant assessed the tax, plaintiff had unloaded the goods from
their importing containers, sea van trailers, had sorted them, and
had stored them with other goods. Because of the bulkiness of the
tires, they had not been packed in cartons, but directly into the
sea van trailer at the place of manufacture. The tubes, however,
were placed in individual boxes, which were then packed in corrugated cartons to be loaded into the trailer. Trailers from the Canadian manufacturing plant were driven to plaintiffs distribution
warehouse while the trailers from the French manufacturing plant
were shipped by sea. 2 At the warehouse the tires were unloaded
from the trailer, sorted, and stored with other goods. The corrugated cartons of tubes were unloaded from the trailer and stored
unopened. Prior to the sale and delivery of these goods by common
carrier to retail dealers in six southeastern states,3 the State Tax
Commissioner assessed a personal property tax on both the tires
and the tubes. He analogized that since warehouses containing
domestically manufactured goods must bear the costs of local police and fire protection, warehouses containing imported goods
should also bear these costs. Otherwise taxes on domestic goods
would be subsidizing the protection of imported goods. Plaintiff
contended that his goods enjoyed constitutional immunity guaranteed by the import-export clause,' which he construed as exempt1. The plaintiff, Michelin Tire Corp., is a New York corporation qualified to
do business in Georgia. It operates as an importer and United States wholesale
distributor of automobile and truck tires and tubes manufactured by Michelin
Tires, Ltd., in France and Nova Scotia, Canada.
2. Upon arrival of the French ship at the United States port of entry, the sea
van trailers were unloaded and tractor-hauled to plaintiff's distribution warehouse after clearing customs and upon payment of a 4% federal import duty.
3. Plaintiff's warehouse was the distribution center for 250-300 franchised
dealers in six southeastern states.
4. The import-export clause states: "No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all
Duties and Imports, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use
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ing goods still in their original packages from state and local taxation. The State trial court agreed to constitutional immunity and
granted plaintiff's request for an injunction against defendant's

collection of the tax on both the tires and the tubes. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in part and reversed in
part.' It agreed that since the tubes were stored in their original

packages, the corrugated shipping cartons, they were immune
from taxation, but it held that the tires lost their status as imports
because they had been stored and incorporated with other shipments. The decision on the immunity of the tubes was not apof the Treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Control of the Congress." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10. The clause
expressly prohibits states from levying taxes on imports. It applies to imported
goods themselves, as well as to taxes on the individual or corporate importer. The
clause allows, however, a state to inspect all goods coming into the state, and to
charge an inspection fee, on the grounds that states should be able to regulate
the safety and healthfulness of products destined for use by its citizens. See
Turner v. Maryland, 107 U.S. 38 (1883); Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. R.R., 125
U.S. 465 (1888).
The clause does not bar governmental port charges such as pilot and wharfage
fees since they are imposed to defray the costs of conducting specific operations
benefiting relatively few parties while importing duties are utilized for the general
welfare of the states. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port, 54 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851) (upheld pilotage fees imposed by the City of Philadelphia); Worsley
v. Second Municipality, 19 La. (9 Rob.) 324 (1844). See also Huse v. Glover, 119
U.S. 543 (1886).
While imported goods are liable only for charges and inspection fees, whoever
handles the goods is himself subject to taxation from the time at which the goods
are placed on the dock, even though the goods retain immunity while on the dock
and while in transit to their domestic buyer. Thus courts have held that handlers
have immunity "up to the water's edge"; stevedores and ships are generally
immune from taxation, but dock and domestic facilities are not. Compare Puget
Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937) (gross receipts tax on
stevedores violated import-export clause) and Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) (gross receipts tax on stevedoring company that
loaded and unloaded ships violated import-export and commerce clauses) with
Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951) (tax levied on dock railroad and
storage facilities did not violate import clause) and Western Md. Ry. v. Rogan,
340 U.S. 520 (1951) (domestic railroad taxable). Since commerce is impeded to a
greater extent by gross receipts taxes than by net income taxes, a lower court
decision has upheld a net income tax on stevedores. See Commonwealth Board
of Finance & Revenue v. Northern Metal Co., 416 Pa. 75, 204 A.2d 467 (1967),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965). On the gross-net distinction, see generally Peck
& Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918); U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247
U.S. 321 (1918).
5. Wages v. Michelin Tire Corp., 233 Ga. 712, 214 S.E.2d 349 (1975).
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pealed. The United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed on the
issue of the taxability of the tires. The import-export clause does
not bar a state from assessing an ad valorem personal property tax
on goods that have arrived at a distribution warehouse, been unloaded from their importing containers, and sorted and stored with
other goods. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 96 S. Ct. 535 (1976).
The problem of taxing imports was not addressed by the Articles
of Confederation. Under the Articles the states were free to tax
goods passing through their harbors in transit to inland states.
This practice fostered trade wars that substantially harmed the
economic strength and cohesiveness of the purported nation-state.6
The drafters of the Constitution fully recognized the problem.
Therefore, they wrote the Constitution to prohibit state taxation

of imports,' and to allow the federal government the exclusive
power to tax imports8 for needed revenue.' The judiciary was left
with the task of determining when an article loses its import status. It has considered several approaches to the problem of locating
the correct point among many; from foreign manufacture through
shipping and storage to final sale. The original package doctrine
was the first attempt at locating a satisfactory point between
import immunity and domestic taxation. The doctrine states that
imported goods do not become taxable until after the breaking of
their original importing package. Its definitive form resulted from
an uncritical and partial application' in Low v. Austin" of the
6. Inland manufacturers who imported their raw materials were forced to bear
additional costs not bome by seaboard manufacturers. Because inland manufacturers had either to absorb the added costs or to raise the sale price of their
products, they were being placed at a competitive disadvantage. To retaliate,
inland states placed tariffs on all products crossing into their states.
7. See note 4 supra.
8. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (where
the constitutionality of federal taxation of imports was upheld).
9. The framers of the Constitution recognized that the survival of the infant
nation depended on its ability to raise and maintain a constant flow of tax revenue. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 11, 12 (A. Hamilton).
10. See W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 295 (1953) [hereinafter cited as CROSSKEY]; Dankis, The Protective Cloak of the Export-Import Clause:Immunity for the Goods orImmunity for
the Process?, 19 LA. L. REV. 747 (1959); Early & Weitzman, A Century of Dissent:
The Immunity of Goods Importedfor Resale from NondiscriminatoryState Per-

sonal Property Taxes, 7 S.W.U.L. REV. 247 (1975); Powell, State Taxation of
Imports- When Does an Import Cease to be an Import?, 58 HARV. L.
(1945).
11. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871).

REV.

858
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earlier Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Maryland.2 The latter
case concerned a Maryland statute that required importers to purchase a fifty dollar import license before importing foreign manufactured goods. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion held that the
State license fee acted as a restraint upon the sale of any foreign
goods, and consequently, violated the import clause. 3 He further
noted that at some point in the import stream the goods and the
sale of the goods would become subject to state taxation. The Chief
Justice speculated that such a point might be the opening of the
original importing package. 4 In Low v. Austin domestically warehoused cases of imported wine about to be sold at retail were held

to be nontaxable because they had yet to be opened. Thus the
Court reduced Marshall's theorizing to a practical test of import
immunity, one that reigned for more than a century. 5 As an alter-

native to the original package doctrine, Chief Justice Marshall had
also proposed an incorporated or mixed-up test," which, though
often discussed, lay in the shadow of the original package doctrine.
This test ended immunity status when the imported goods became
incorporated into the domestic stream of commerce. Under the
original package doctrine, the importer, in determining when the
original package would be opened, could himself decide when his
goods lost immunity. The mixed-up text, however, sought to re12. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
13. Even though the Maryland tax was not directly levied on the goods, but
indirectly on the importer himself, the tax violated the clause because the inflow
of goods was nonetheless restrained.
14. Chief Justice Marshall recognized the difficulty in constructing a rule. He
acknowledged that: "it might be premature to state any rule as being universal
in its application. It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the
importer had so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become incorporated
and mixed-up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its
distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power
of the states; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse,
in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too
plainly a duty on imports, to escape the prohibition in the Constitution." Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441 (1827) (emphasis added).
15. As well as uncritically applying Brown v. Maryland dicta, the Low v.
Austin Court also misread the License Cases' interpretation of Brown. The
License Cases held that unpackaged imported goods subject to sale were taxable.
The Court in Low v. Austin argued that the case stood for the proposition that
packaged goods would be immune, while the instant decision interpreted the case
to hold that when goods are subject to sale, they have come to rest within the
state and are taxable. See License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).

16, See note 14 supra.
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place the importer's power of decision with a more objective and
less personal criterion for loss of immunity. Still, the mixed-up test
only pushed the question back, for it defined import status with a
concept that also required clarification. To say that goods lose
their import status when they became "incorporated into the domestic stream of commerce" is to pose a problem, not to solve one,
for "incorporated" is as nebulous a term as "import." Another
alternative solution to the problem is to declare that goods proceeding to the distribution warehouse are "in transit" and immune
from taxation; after arrival, goods stored at the warehouse are said
to have "come to rest" and are taxable.' 7 This criterion for loss of
import immunity rests upon a clearly defined point at which g 9 ods
may be classified as domestic and taxable, and it destroys the
importer's prerogative to decide when immunity is lost. Further,
this approach perfectly aligns with current interstate commerce'"
and export'9 case law, under which goods that have left the warehouse and have begun their interstate or export movement are
immune from taxation. From this viewpoint it is unfortunate that
the in transit test, like the mixed-up test, also hid in the shadow

of the original package doctrine, which itself posed problems whose
17.

The labels "in transit" and "come to rest" have been frequently used in

import-export and commerce clause decisions. "In transit" refers to the period
when goods are passing through a port or moving between two states, while "come
to rest" refers to the time before and after the transit journey. When goods come
to rest or stop in a state, they begin to receive police and fire protection and, as a
quid pro quo for this protection, they are subject to state and local taxes. A mere
short stoppage for transit purposes does not subject the goods to taxation. See Joy
Oil Co., Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 337 U.S. 286 (1949) (where a fifteen month
stoppage subjected goods to taxation).
18. Under the Commerce Clause, goods before and after their interstate journey are considered to have "come to rest" and are taxable. But goods "in transit"

through the states are immune from taxation. See LIBRARY

OF CONGRESS, CONGRES-

SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

197 (1973). See generally Note, Constitutional

Law-State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-Commerce Clause Analysis, 76
W. VA. L. REV. 380 (1974).
19. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974). In Kosydar the
Supreme Court used the mechanistic "in transit" test to determine when goods
were taxable. Even though they were likely to be exported, goods stored in domestic warehouses were held to be subject to taxation simply because they were still
so stored. The Court had previously used a certainty test that resulted in frequent
litigation over whether it was "certain" the goods were destined for export. To
bar the need for subjective arguments, the mechanistic "in transit" test was
adopted. See generally Abramson, State Taxation of Exports: The Stream of
Constitutionality,54 N.C.L. REV. 59 (1975).
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purported solutions were, if anything, more problematic still. The
facts of the instant case illustrate the first problem, that of determining which "package" must be opened to end the immunity. At
Michelin's foreign manufacturing plant, the tubes were packed in
boxes that were in turn placed in corrugated cartons before being
loaded into the sea van trailers. If the domestic unpackaging occurs in three distinct stages, the problem arises as to which stage
actually ends the immunity: the opening of the sea van trailers, of
the corrugated cartons, or of the individual boxes. The Supreme
Court's only decision in the area occurred before the advent of
containerized shipping. In that case, May v. New Orleans,0 the
Court had to decide whether immunity ended at the opening of the
cartons or at the opening of the smaller boxes within the cartons.
The Court recognized that if immunity ended at the opening of the
smaller boxes the importer would be tempted to wrap each item
separately in a box before placing it in the cartons. Upon arrival

in the United States the cartons would be opened by the wholesaler
but the boxes would be stored until sale to the retailer. The retailer
would also store the goods, probably next to their domestic taxpaying counterparts, and open them only at the last possible moment.
The Court found this plan unacceptable, since the domestic goods
alone would be paying for benefits and protection also received by
imported goods. The Court in this case held, therefore, that the
opening of the cartons and not the boxes within them ended immunity. The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari, however,
in a case involving containerized shipping-a practice that adds
another candidate for the original package-and lower courts are
split in determining whether immunity ceases at the opening of the
smaller or larger container. 21 Apart from the determination of
which container constitutes the original package, a second problem
posed by the original package doctrine has arisen: determining
the point at which raw materials, which are never "opened,"
lose their immunity. If the same manufacturer both imports and
consumes unpackaged raw materials, they could escape taxation.
20. 178 U.S. 496 (1900).
21. Compare Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App.3d
689, 90 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1970) (where containers were held to have been the original
packages), with State Tax Comm'n v. Garmet Corp., 32 Mich. App. 715, 189
N.W.2d 72, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971) (where containers were held not to
have been the original package). See also, Note, Shipping Containersas Original
Packages:Are ContainerizedImports Immune from State Taxation?, 36 OHIO ST.
L.J. 421 (1975).
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First, there would be in this instance no importing packages to
be broken. 2 Secondly, by not selling his goods to a domestic
buyer, the importer would *avoid yet another test for the end of
immunity, for the action of resale has been considered as a point
of loss of immunity alternative to the point described by the
original package doctrine.? This second problem with the original
package doctrine arises only when, as in the following cases, the
importer is also the consumer. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Bowers24 and the companion case of United States Plywood Co. v.
City of Algoma25" held that raw materials committed to the manufacturing process by the importer-consumer were taxable even
though they were never "opened." Paramount in the Court's mind,
in creating the commitment-to-manufacturing concept as an alternative point of loss of immunity, was the inability of the original
package doctrine to cope with the existence of the importer's immunity from taxation. For example, stored domestic goods were
being forced to shoulder costs for police and fire protection which
were also enjoyed by stored imported goods. These added costs
placed the marketability of the domestic goods at a competitive
disadvantage. Both the Plywood and Youngstown decisions had to
contend with the earlier Supreme Court opinion in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt. 6 That case held that imported Philippine hemp
stored at the place of manufacture was immune from taxation.
Hooven's stored hemp possibly would have been taxable if the case
22. Of course, if the raw materials were imported in packages, the original
package doctrine would apply. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama,

288 U.S 218 (1933) (where a franchise tax was levied on a corporation that had
imported 100 pound bags of nitrate since they were still being stored in their
importing bags).
23. Waring v. Mayor, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110 (1868).

24. The Youngstown opinion involved the importation of iron ore and its
storage for three months on the grounds of an Ohio steel plant. Needed ore was
taken from the storage piles and trucked to stock bins adjacent to the steel
furnaces. After one or two days of storage in the bins, the ore was fed into the
furnaces. The State of Ohio levied an ad valorem personal property tax on stored
ore, both in piles and in bins. The United States Supreme Court sustained the
tax on the grounds that during the storage period the ore had been destined or
committed to the manufacturing process. Because the original package doctrine
failed to provide a means of taxing raw materials the Court was forced to create
this alternative point of loss of immunity. 358 U.S. 534 (1959).

25. In Plywood the Court held that sorted green lumber and bundled veneers

had lost their tax immunity when stored while committed to the manufacturing

process. 358 U.S. 534.
26. 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
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had been decided after Youngstown and Plywood, since the facts
of all three cases are the same. In order to distinguish the later
cases from the holding in Hooven, the Court noted that Hooven's
immunity was based solely on the storage of the goods"7 and not
on their being committed to immediate manufacturing needs. Although Youngstown's committment-to-manufacturing concept
and the refined definition of "package" seem to correct the shortcomings of the original package doctrine, the former concept might
create future problems, while the latter has already lead to complications, as with containerized packaging, and will continue to do
so. On the other hand, these shortcomings of the original package
doctrine have led to fresh examinations of the wording of the
import-export clause and of the problems which brought it about.
W. Crosskey interprets the terms "impost" and "duties" as referring only to port-levied excise and custom duties, not to state and
local taxes.2" Since the Constitution's references to tax broadly
denote state and local taxes as well as duties, Crosskey argues the
import-export clause would have prohibited "taxes" not "imposts"
and "duties," if it was meant to protect imported goods from any
taxation whatsoever. Finally, the problems of the original package
doctrine have highlighted the changes that have occurred in the
importing process since the writing of the Constitution. When the
Constitution was drafted there were only a few ports of entry into
the United States, while today airports and additional harbors
have greatly increased their number. At present, the need for a
strong import-export prohibition against entry point taxation is
not as pressing because competitive forces between ports tend to
reduce any taxes charged. The problems presented by the doctrine,
therefore, are sufficient in number and complexity to suggest the
need for a new look at the policies underlying the import-export
324 U.S. at 667.
1 CROSSKEY at 296-97. See also 2 M.
CONVENTION 305 (1911) [hereinafter cited as
27.
28.

FARRAND,
FARRAND],

RECORDS OF

THE

FEDERAL

which reports a debate

during the last draft of the import-export clause. The debaters recognized that
the terms imposts and duties did not also encompass property taxes. "By the
power to lay and collect taxes, [Congress] may proceed to direct taxation on
every individual, either by capitation tax on their heads, or an assessment on
their property. By this part of the section therefore, the government has power to
lay what duties they please on goods imported; to lay what duties they please,
afterwards, on whatever we use or consume; to impose stamp duties to what
amount they please, and in whatever case they please; afterwards to impose on
the people direct taxes, by capitation tax, or by assessment, to what amount they

chose;

....

."

3 FARRAND 203-04.
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clause and at ways in which the clause may maintain its usefulness
in the midst of changing commercial practices and increasing revenue requirements of state and local governments.
In the instant case, the Court acknowledged that the original
package doctrine in effect fostered a taxation of domestic goods
that was unfair insofar as it provided revenue used to buy protective services for untaxed imported goods. In addition, the Court
found the doctrine to manifest two intrinsic complications. The
doctrine does not provide clear guidelines either for determining
which package, if opened, would decide the end of immunity, or
for determining the taxability of stored raw materials committed
to the manufacturing process. Moreover, the Court held that these
complications have tended to mislead the courts into ignoring the
original purpose of the terms of the import-export clause: that is,
to bar port and in transit duties, not state and local taxes. 2 To
remedy these past deficiencies, the instant Court expressly overruled Low v. Austin," the prime exponent of the original package
doctrine, noting that this case employed the speculative dicta of
Brown v. Maryland without proper critical analysis. 3' Instead the

Court viewed import immunity as effective when goods are in port
and in common carrier transportation, but as ceasing upon their
arrival and storage at domestic warehouses. This test of immunity,
the in transit method, provides an alternative to the original package doctrine. Significantly, however, the instant holding is not
necessarily inconsistent with the original package doctrine, for the
instant facts include the opening of the sea van trailer, which could
be interpreted as the breaking of the original package. Thus the
holding of the instant case could have been based upon either the
original package doctrine or the in transit approach, despite the
Court's overruling of Low v. Austin and its dicta. Most narrowly
applied, the Court's decision held that when imported goods have
arrived at a distribution warehouse, have been unloaded from their
importing containers, and have been sorted and stored with other
goods, they are subject to state and local personal property taxes.2
29. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
30. In the sole concurring opinion in the instant case, Justice White would
have preferred not to have expressly overruled Low v. Austin without a more
thorough consideration of all the potential implications. 96 S. Ct. at 548.
31. 96 S. Ct. at 539, 547.
32. Not all state and local taxes may be imposed on imported goods after they
have come to rest within the state. A state may not pass a law which only taxes
the retail sales of imported goods, while the retail sales of domestic goods goes
untaxed. Such a tax, even though operating after the goods have come to rest,
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The instant case reflects a willingness of the Court to overturn
its original package doctrine and to adopt an in transit test. This
new test will generally shorten the period during which goods remain immune from taxation. While previously the importer could
retain immunity by storing his goods in the original package at the
warehouse, henceforth the goods will be subject to taxation. Even
though the Court overruled the case that principally expounded
the original package doctrine, subsequent opinions could return to
it. In the instant fact situation the containerized goods had been
taken out of an importing package prior to their taxation. The
decision, therefore, did not directly contravene the original package doctrine, but it does point out the hazards of the original
package doctrine sufficiently to warrant its being discarded. Indeed, exactly what remains of the original package doctrine would
have been ascertained had the Tax Commissioner appealed the
State Supreme Court's decision that the tubes stored in their corrugated shipping cartons are immune from taxation.33 One complication of such a test would lie in determining which container, the
corrugated carton or the sea van trailer, comprised the original
package. According to the principles of the instant case, however,
this complication would be forestalled by the in transit method,
the Tax Commissioner would probably be successful, and the last
vestiges of the original package doctrine would perish. The instant
case may also change the import status of raw materials: Hooven's
storage immunity could be overruled, and Youngstown's commitment to the manufacturing test would be modified. The point of
taxation of raw materials would be at the end of their process of
transit, when they arrived at the manufacturing site. It is, then,
not an overstatement to conclude that the holding of Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages signals the imminent demise of the original package doctrine. Because of its severe limitations the original package
doctrine cannot be adapted, as can the in transit approach, to the
pri rciples and practice of modem commerce. No less significantly,
the current approach brings the import clause under the in transit
umb rella already covering the export and commerce clauses. 4
Robert J. Warren
acts as a discriminatory duty on imported goods. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S.
(8 Otto) 566 (1878).
33.
34.

96 S. Ct. at 538.
See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.

JURISDICTION-ALIEN

DEFENDANTS IN FEDERAL QUESTION

Ac-

TIONS-FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS MAY LOOK AT ALIEN DEFENDANT'S
AGGREGATE CONTACTS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN DECIDING
WHETHER TO EXERCISE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION

Defendants' manufacture and sell American-patented surgical

instruments to various distributors in the United States (F.O.B.
England) and provide technical assistance to the distributors and
users of its products. The distributors sell to independent dealers
as well as directly to hospitals and surgeons. Defendant also has a
non-manufacturing licensee in Connecticut. Furthermore, defendant had allegedly negotiated with plaintiff,2 an American surgical
instruments manufacturer, concerning the American patents and
had allegedly encouraged and supported a suit against plaintiff in
Connecticut. Plaintiff brought a patent infringement suit against
defendant in federal district court in Connecticut, serving process
under the Connecticut long-arm statute4 as authorized by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and (i)(1)(D).5 Defendant moved to
1. Spembly, Ltd. and Spembly Technical Products, Ltd. are related British
corporations having their principal places of business in England. The two corporations will be referred to jointly as one corporate defendant.
2. Cryomedics, Inc., a Connecticut corporation, manufactures and sells surgical instruments under United States patent.
3. Civil patent infringement suits are authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1970).
Plaintiff alleged direct infringement, active inducement of infringement, contributory infringement, and sought a declaration of the invalidity of defendant's
patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1970).
4. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411(c) is as follows:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident
of this state, or by a person having a usual place of business in this state,
whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted

business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows: (1) out
of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state; or (2)
out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the state; or (3) out of the
production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporation with
the expectation that such goods by such corporation with the expectation
that such goods are to be used or consumed in this state and are so used or
consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers; or (4) out of tortious conduct in this state,
whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising
out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e):
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dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction,6 arguing that due pro-

cess required that it have certain minimum contacts with the State
of Connecticut,' and that its contacts with the State were insufficient to satisfy the due process standards. Plaintiff contended that
it had alleged sufficient contacts with the State, and alternatively
that defendant's status as an alien permitted the court to consider
defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole rather than
just with a particular state. The district court, held, motion to dismiss denied. A federal court may properly exercise in personam
jurisdiction over an alien defendant in a suit arising from federal
law if the alien's aggregate contacts with the United States satisfy
the due process requirements of the fifth amendment and process
is properly served according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D.
Conn. 1975).
Federal courts have wrestled with the extremely confused area
of in personam jurisdiction in federal question cases" since 1875,
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder
provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of
summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in
which the district court is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there is no
provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in
this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the
district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice,
or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found
within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and
respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment
or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in
either case be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed
by the statute or rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1):
Manner. When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (c) of this
rule authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within

the state in which the district court is held, and service is to be effected

upon the party in a foreign country, it is also sufficient if service of the
summons is made:

. .

. (D) by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt,

to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be
served; . ...

6. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (2). Defendant also moved to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
7. Defendant relied on InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), which initiated the "fairness" doctrine.
8. Since diversity of citizenship jurisdictional matters involve different considerations, this discussion will focus upon cases of federal subject matter jurisdiction. For recent examples on diversity of citizenship cases based upon the long-
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when district courts were first given jurisdiction over general cases
"arising under" national law Under the 1875 law, venue'0 in federal question cases was proper in any district where the defendant
was an "inhabitant" or "in which he shall be found."" Congress

in 1888 restricted venue, however, to the district in which the
defendant was an inhabitant.' 2 In construing the federal question
venue provision of the 1888 act, the Supreme Court decided that
Congress intended for aliens to be without its coverage since they
could not be residents of any district. Thus the Court held that suit
against aliens was proper in any district in which service of process
was possible." The law remained substantially unchanged until
arm statutes of 30 States, see Special Project, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 345
(1976).
9. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. .470. For a thorough
discussion of federal question jurisdiction see Mishkin, The Federal "Question"
in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1953).
10. It is important at this point to distinguish between jurisdiction, venue,
and service of process. The United States has jurisdiction, i.e., power, over any
person, corporation, or property within its territory or that meets the minimum
contacts requirement of due process under the fifth amendment. A particular
district court must, however, also be competent to adjudicate the case. This
competence is determined by the venue statutes, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970).
If there is federal jurisdiction and proper venue by statute, valid service of process
is still necessary to satisfy due process by providing reasonable notice. Even if
there is invalid service of process, the court still has power over the party and has
competence to adjudicate the controversy. The exercise of the power, however,
may be challenged on the basis of denial of due process. An improper service of
process may be cured by a valid service, but usually the basis of jurisdiction over
a party exists or does not exist by the time of suit in a case involving service under
a long-arm statute. Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal
Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REv. 608 (1954); Green, Federal
JurisdictionIn Personam of Corporationsand Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967,
968, 981 (1961). Service is regulated by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and special federal statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (1970)
(foreign applicant registering for trademark); 28 U.S.C. § 1694 (1970) (patent
infringement); 43 U.S.C. § 1062 (1970) (unlawful enclosure of public lands); 49
U.S.C. § 321(c) (1970) (agent in state for motor carriers); 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTiCE

11.
12.

4.14 (1975).

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
Act of August 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433.

13. In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893) (patent infringement); Barrow S.S. Co.
v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898) (civil assault). In Barrow, a New Jersey resident sued
a British corporation (doing business in New York) in the U.S. Circuit Court
[now district]. The defendant argued that the jurisdiction of United States
courts within New York depended on the authority given by New York State
statutes. The Supreme Court stated: "The fact that the legislature [of New
York] has not seen fit to authorize like suits to be brought in its own courts...

438

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9:435

Congress enacted the Judiciary Code of 1948, which included specific venue statutes for corporations and aliens.' 4 At no time during
this period was venue for aliens or alien corporations regulated by
other than federal law. Whether federal or state law ultimately
applies to service of process, however, has been a difficult issue up
to the present. From 1872 until 1938, the Conformity Act required
the district courts to apply the procedural rules of the state in
which they sat in cases at law, and the federal rules and special
statutes for cases at equity and admiralty.'" Thus, under the Conformity Act, process in cases at law in federal courts was served
pursuant to state law except that no service outside the state was
permitted, notwithstanding a state statute allowing it. One of the
primary uncertainties concerning the new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure" when they were introduced in 1938 was the extent to
which state law would apply to disputes over service of process.
The Supreme Court has never answered this question directly, but
beginning with Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,'7 the Court stressed a
dichotomy between cases brought under diversity of citizenship
and cases brought under federal question jurisdiction,'" and has
cannot deprive such citizens [of other states] of their right to invoke the jurisdiction of the national courts under the Constitution and the laws of the United
States." 170 U.S. at 112. For a discussion of the rationale behind these decisions
see 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.142 [6] (1975).
14. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 935. The relevant portions of
that Act, § 1391(c) and (d), have not been amended. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970).
15. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197. The Act applied to the
"practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other
than equity or admiralty causes. . . ." See DOBIE,HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

(1928) for a discussion of pre-1938 law and judicial inter-

pretation of the Conformity Act.
16. The United States Supreme Court promulgated the new Rules pursuant
to the authority given it by the Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1, 2 (48 Stat.
1064), 28 U.S.C., § 2072 (1970). The Court transmitted the Rules to the Attorney

General on December 20, 1937, and they became effective September 16, 1938.
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 224 (1963). Among the provisions were new means
for service of process. FED. R. Civ. P. 2, 4. Rule 4(d)(3) provides for personal
service by delivery to an officer, or a managing or general agent of a domestic or
foreign corporation or partnership. Rule 4(f) extends the territorial limits for this
manner of service to a 100 mile radius from the court house for third party
defendants or parties to a cross-claim or counterclaim. Otherwise, under 4(d)(7),
one may serve process upon a defendant in accordance with the law of the state
in which the court sits-the practice used before 1938.
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. The following cases hold state law inapplicable when a federal court adjudicates a claim based on federal law: Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953)
(admiralty); Holmberg v. Albrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) (Federal Farm Loan Act);
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implicitly divided the use of service of process along these lines.
Erie held that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the State."' 9 That rule was applied to a diversity of
citizenship case at law. In Russell v. Todd," decided the same
year, the Court held that state law had no application in a suit
involving a federal equitable right. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,2 '
distinguished between federal and state created equitable rights
and required the district court to apply the state statute of limitations in a diversity of citizenship case arising from a state equitable
right. Thus, the real distinction was whether the suit's basis was
federal or state-created rights and not whether the case was at law
or equity. State substantive law applies in diversity of citizenship
cases so far as is necessary to reach the same outcome as would be
reached by state court. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction of the
federal court and its service of process extends only to the limits
of state court jurisdiction and service of process. On the other
hand, in federal question cases, state court jurisdictional (as distinguished from service of process) limitations do not affect the
exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court sitting in that state. As
to service of process under Rule 4(d)(7),2 however, most federal
district courts have followed the state interpretation of state longClearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1942); D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (Federal Reserve Act); Deitrick v. Greaney,
309 U.S. 190 (1939) (National Bank Act); Board of Comm'ners v. United States,
308 U.S. 343 (1939) (tax exemption for Indians). Some decisions which uphold
the application of state law in various legal matters are; Angel v. Bullington, 330
U.S. 183 (1947) ("door closing" statute); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1940) (conflict of laws); Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939) (burden
of proof).
19.

304 U.S. at 78.

20.

309 U.S. 280 (1939).

21. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
22.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be served
together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such
copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows: . . .(7) upon a
defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) [individuals] or (3)
[corporations or associations] of this subdivision of this rule, it is also
sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the manner prescribed by
the law of the state in which the district court is held for the service of
summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an action
brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state.

4-t0
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arm statutes.' :' In recognizing this dichotomy between diversity

and federal question cases, the district courts have generally approached amenability of a defendant to federal question suit by
using a federal standard of fairness2 4 extrapolated from

InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,5 but they examine the defendant's contacts with the state in which the trial court sits.2"
Recently a few courts, however, have held that the fairness of
claiming in personam jurisdiction over a corporate or individual
defendant in a federal question suit depends upon contacts with
the United States rather than the contacts with only the state,
since a government's jurisdiction extends to all those within its
geographical limits. 7 In the first case to apply this theory, First
23. In Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960),
however, a two-judge majority said that the reach of service of process under Rule
4(d)(7) using the state long-arm statute is subject only to congressional policy and
not to state court interpretation. Judge Friendly, in a separate concurring opinion, disagreed with that rationale and stated that the federal courts under these
circumstances must use state interpretation of the long-arm statutes except "in
fields

. . .

that are distinctively federal or where the Constitution, treaties, fed-

eral statutes, or rules having the force of law show an intent that the federal courts
are to fashion federal law .

. . ."

282 F.2d at 517. Subsequently Jaftex was over-

ruled by Arrowsmith v. United PressInt'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (J. Friendly
for the majority). This holding is strongly disapproved in 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE $ 0.317 [5] and 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE 4.25 [7] (1975), but
the authors of that work admit that virtually all circuits now agree that state law
of jurisdiction in diversity cases should be followed.
24. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 807 (1948);
Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir.
1954).
25. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948)
(antitrust); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co., 212 F.2d 147
(5th Cir, 1954) (Carmack amendment); Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 397

F.2d 1(3d Cir. 1968) (Federal Employers Liability Act); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz
Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (patent infringement); Rheem Mfg.
Co. v. Johnson Heater Corp., 370 F. Supp. 806 (D. Minn. 1974) (patent infringement); Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines," 390 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975)
(Warsaw Convention damages); PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc.,
392 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (copyright).
27. The "presence" theory as set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto)
714 (1877), and broadened by subsequent decisions including InternationalShoe,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), usually is applied to states within the federal system. In order
to exercise state jurisdiction, the defendant must reside in the state, be found in
the state, or have such close contacts with the state that it is as though he, or it,
in the case of corporations, was present in the state. In the latter situation, service
of process outside the state fulfills the function of notice of suit while the contacts
fulfill the requirement that entertainment of the suit in that state be fundamen-
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Flight Co. v. National CarloadingCo.,25 Judge Frank Wilson (now
on the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of

the Judicial Conference of the United States) stated that because
the cause of action was federally created the relevant inquiry in
determining jurisdiction concerned contacts with the United
States as sovereign and not contacts with the territory of the district court. Since the third party defendant in that case was incorporated within the United States, the court found that the only
limiting requirement upon exercise of its jurisdiction was proper
service of process and that had been met by service on the only
soliciting agent present in the state. 9 In a later case, Edward J.
Moriarty & Co. v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co.,31 a Greek citizen doing
business in the United States was a defendant in an antitrust
action. The court found that the United States had personal jurisdiction on the basis of his business contacts within the country.
Then, in considering the venue question, the court noted that although 15 U.S.C. § 22 provides for venue under the Sherman Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) provides that venue for aliens is appropriate
in any district, and the latter special provision prevails. Process
had been served under Rule 4(d)(7) and (e) in accordance with
Ohio law which was satisfied by transaction of business within the
state. :" Since the Moriarty decision, several other courts have aptally fair. This is closely related to the territorial theory of international jurisdiction. A nation may also subject an alien to suit if there is proper notice of the
suit and the alien has enough contacts with that nation to be considered equitably
present for legal purposes. See Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule
I0(b)(5), 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363, 1368 (1973). Thus, in respect to actions involving alien individuals and corporations, the United States is an entity which
should have jurisdiction over those within its territory or who have contacts
sufficient to satisfy the fifth amendment. Compare Green, FederalJurisdiction
In Personamof Corporationsand Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967, 970-72 (1961)
with von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1123-25 at note 6 (1966). For a discussion of the
problems of federal process in such cases, see Smit, InternationalAspects of
Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1031, 1032-53 (1961).
28. 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
29. Normally, a defendant could argue for a transfer under forum non
conveniens, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), when contacts are so minimal. In this case,
however, the contesting party was a third party defendant and not entitled to
raise that issue except as relating to the allowance of the third party suit.
30. 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (Sherman Act conspiracy action).
31. The court in Moriartywent through the same analysis concerning contacts
with the United States as appeared in FirstFlight Co., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962), and critically suggested that a federal rule or statute allowing substi-
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proved the United States entity concept and have at least partially
by the defendant's
'justified the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
3
1
States.
United
the
aggregate contacts with

The court in the instant case first examined defendant's alleged

contacts with Connecticut33 and admitted that there might not be
sufficient contacts to entertain the suit solely on that basis. But

the court rejected defendant's contention that minimum contacts

tuted service of process upon an alien corporation with minimum contacts would
be logical and appropriate. 289 F. Supp. at 390.
32. In Holt v. Klosters Rederi AIS, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973), the
defendant Norwegian ship line solicited passenger business throughout the
United States and picked up a large percentage of its passengers in Florida. After
holding that there were sufficient contacts with the United States, the court
transferred the case to the Southern District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1404,
forum non conveniens. The court in Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973) (patent infringement) explored thoroughly
the policies on both sides of the jurisdiction issue and noted that if the aggregate
contacts approach was not used, there might be no other possible forum for the
infringement action although a manufacturer was intentionally sending the infringing products into the United States in great quantities. In considering the
policy issue of the burden on international trade of these suits, the court admitted
that amenability to suit might deter some foreign manufacturers from exporting
to the United States. The court commented that the alternative, granting a
nationwide injunction halting importation of allegedly infringing equipment,
would stop future infringement but would impose liability upon the importers and
distributors only, fail to reach the manufacturer for the past harm caused, and
disrupt international trade to an extent greater than would the payment of monetary damages by the manufacturer. 362 F.Supp. at 729. The court in Alco Standard Corp v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972), exercised jurisdiction in a
Securities and Exchange Act § 10(b) suit against Spanish defendants who had
negotiated with plaintiffs in New York, Tampa, and Chicago. Compare
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d at 1143, note 2. There, the
Seventh Circuit noted the possibility of using the aggregate contacts approach

but declined and based jurisdiction on the numerous contacts with the State of
Illinois in that patent infringement suit.
33. The court also dealt with the foreseeability of the defendant's alleged
contacts with the State of Connecticut. For recovery of injury caused within a
state by conduct occurring outside the state, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant "must know, or have good reason to know, that this conduct will have
effects in the state seeking to assert jurisdiction over him." Leasco Data Processing Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972), commented upon in 6
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 687 (1973). This viewpoint seems anomalous in a federal
question suit because it is not Connecticut which is asserting jurisdiction, but
rather the state of the United States. For a brief discussion of the theory of
international jurisdiction relating to conduct in one nation causing effects in
another, see Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule 10(b)(5), 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 1363, 1368 (1973). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 49,
50 (1971).
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with Connecticut were the sole basis for exercising jurisdiction. On
the contrary, the court focused on the dichotomy between federal
question and diversity jurisdiction and stated that the United
States is the appropriate unit of government with which there
must be contacts in federal question suits. The court supported
this viewpoint by reviewing the rationale that the geographical
limits of the unit of government of which the court is a part determine the extent of the court's jurisdiction rather than the territory
of the state where it is located. 3 The court thus refused to apply
the standards of International Shoe on the ground that

InternationalShoe dealt with state court jurisdiction and not with
federal court jurisdiction in a federally-created cause of action.
The court criticised those courts which have imported the
InternationalShoe restrictions into federal question litigation involving alien defendants. The court distinguished the fact situation in International Shoe by noting that forum conveniens, an
important consideration in that case, was not significant here because defendant is an alien corporation doing business in the
United States only through other companies. The court implied
that it should not matter to a British corporation without a permanent office in the United States whether it defends a suit in Connecticut or any other state. The court then applied the fairness
standard of the fifth amendment's due process clause and found
that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient contacts with the United
States to justify exercise of jurisdiction. A pending suit against this
defendant in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in which jurisdiction had been found, was a significant indication to the court
of the defendant's contacts with the United States.35 Therefore,
the court ruled that plaintiff should be allowed to prove the contacts alleged and denied the motion to dismiss. "
The court's decision in the instant case gives great support to a
34. The court cited the following cases in support of plaintiff's contentions:
Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (Death on the
High Seas Act suit against Norwegian corporationz; Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Securities and Exchange Act suit against
Canadian citizen); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F.
Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (Sherman Act conspiracy suit against a Greek citizen).

35. The court suggested that defendant could remedy the problem of multiple
litigation by moving to stay one or more of the proceedings.
36. Furthermore, there was sufficient showing of conflict over the patents to
justify thc exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the count seeking a declara-

tion that defendant's patent was void and not infringed. See note 6 supra.
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new standard for in personam jurisdiction over alien defendants in
federal question suits to replace the existing quagmire of case law
in this area. At present, the fragmentation of federal law caused
by the necessary use of differing state long-arm statutes and the
determination of minimum contacts with the particular state
means that the effective benefit and protection of many federallycreated rights can be limited by the reach of the law of the state
in which the district court sits. 3 7 While a district court adjudicating

a case under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction may be expected
to reach a result substantially similar to that which would be
reached in a state court, this should not occur in the federal
system when a special federal right is involved. Statutes creating
federal rights are by definition national in scope and uniform national application is implicit in that national character. Hopefully
the instant decision and the -few cases preceding it will promote
greater uniformity of treatment in actions involving alien defendants who sometimes try to insulate themselves from amenability
to suit. In each case of this type, the equity of not forcing an alien
to defend against an action far from the principal place of business
is balanced against that of the protection of rights of domestic
plaintiffs for whom no other remedy may be adequate or available.
If the aggregate contacts approach were common, substantially
greater justice might be achieved as alien defendants are forced as
a condition of being allowed to cultivate and reap profits from a
foreign country's market, to recognize their responsibility to the
foreign country that consumes their product. Admittedly, however, an extreme extension of the aggregate contacts rationale
could lead to an unjust result upon occasion. But the general fairness standard of fifth amendment due process and the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, with which federal courts are most familiar,
serve to militate against such occurrences. Besides the equity factor, the examination of minimum contacts from the national
perspective seems a more logical parallel to the relationship between state courts and state jurisdiction."8 Ultimately, more deci37. It may be argued that the differences in reach between different states'
long-arm statutes undoubtedly leads to a certain amount of "forum shopping."
A plaintiff suffering harm in interstate trade will bring suit in district court in

that state in which the long-arm statute reaches the furthest. This may occur less
frequently as more state statutes are amended and construed as reaching to the
constitutional limits of due process of the fourteenth amendment.
38. Within a state, statutes define proper venue for a common law or statutory
action. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 395(a) (West 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.011
(1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. 110 § 5 (1962); N.Y. Civ. P. LAw § 503 (McKinney 1963);
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sions following this line of reasoning should cause Congress or the
Supreme Court to examine and remedy the statutes and rules
concerning jurisdiction and provide the necessary and desirable
uniformity of jurisdictional treatment in federal question cases.
One method of implementation would be substituted service of
process upon the United States Secretary of State with direction
to notify the alien defendant, a procedure similar to that existing
in many states under various types of statutes. 39 Alternatively,
nationwide service of process could be instituted providing that
notice of suit be given to any domestic "agents" and to the alien
defendant if the latter is not found within the United States. 40
Perhaps then, with respect to such cases and defendants, federallycreated rights may be enforced equally by plaintiffs throughout the
United States without regard to state law.

Ronald C. Finke
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2390 (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. 261.01 (1957). Venue

in transitory actions is generally based on forum conveniens considerations except
for actions against non-residents. These usually may be brought in the court of
any county, but certain statutes restrict such actions to the county where plaintiff
resides. When the circuit or county court looks to the exercise of jurisdiction over
the non-resident defendant, the relevant question is whether that defendant has
sufficient contacts with or may be found within the state, not of sufficient contacts with the county.
39. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 8 §§ 376, 381, 382 (1975) (agent for foreign corporations); ILL. ANN. STAT. 140 § 10 (1973) (agent for registration of trademarks);
MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 9.2103 (1973) (agent for non-resident motorists).
40. See Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal
Courts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608, 635 (1954). The Supreme
Court has long and often stated that Congress has the power to provide nationwide service of process. Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838);
United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); Robertson v.
Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925).

TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962-DELEGATES AUTHORITY TO
THE EXECUTIVE TO ADJUST THE IMPORTATION OF PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY ONLY
THROUGH DIRECT MECHANISMS-A PROGRAM OF LICENSE FEES AND A
SUPPLEMENTARY FEE PER BARREL IS AN INDIRECT MECHANISM BEYOND
THE SCOPE OF § 1862(b)

Plaintiffs, eight states,' their governors, 2 ten utility companies,3
and one member of Congress,4 brought suit to overturn the imposition of license fees and a supplementary fee per barrel on the
importation of oil and petroleum products as required by Proclamations 4210 and 43411 issued by Presidents Nixon and Ford on
the grounds, inter alia, that the executives had exceeded their
authority under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.6 Plaintiffs based
1. State of Connecticut, State of Maine, Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
State of New Jersey, State of New York, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State
of Rhode Island, State of Vermont. The State of Minnesota subsequently intervened as plaintiff.

2. Governors Ella Grasso, James B. Longley, Michael S. Dukakis, Brendan
T. Byrne, Hugh Carey, Milton J. Shapp, Phillip W. Noel, Thomas P. Salmon.
3. Algonquin SNG, Inc., New England Power Co., New Bedford Gas & Edison
Light Co., Cambridge Electric Light Co., Canal Electric Co., Montaup Electric
Co., the Connecticut Light and Power Co., the Hartford Electric Light Co., Western Massachusetts Electric Light Co., Holyoke Water Co.
4. Representative Robert P. Drinan, S.J. (Dem., Mass.).
5. Proclamation 4341 follows President Nixon's Proclamation 4210, which
took effect on May 1, 1973, in all major respects. Proclamation 4210 abolished the
quota system whereby limits were set for various Districts of the United States
to limit the importation of oil; President Nixon's plan involved the issuance of
licenses which were conditioned on a schedule of license fees. Fee-free imports
were allowed up to the individual's previous quota; the fee-free allocations were
to be gradually phased out until 1980 when license fees would be required on all
oil imports covered by the Proclamation. Proclamation 4341, signed January 23,
1975, provided for an increase in the license fees. The fee schedules announced
in 1973 were accelerated to the maximum levels of $0.21 per barrel on imported
crude oil and $0.63 per barrel on imported petroleum products. Supplemental fees
of $3 per barrel on imported crude oil and $1.20 per barrel on petroleum products
were imposed. On February 19, 1975, Congress passed a bill imposing a 90 day
moratorium on Proclamation 4341. On March 4, President Ford vetoed the bill
but suspended the imposition of supplemental fees for two months and then
continued the suspension for 30 more days. On June 1, President Ford imposed
the second dollar of the supplemental fee. 518 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1975).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970) provides:
(b) Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an interested party, or upon his own motion, the Director of the
Office of Emergency Planning (hereinafter in this section referred to as the
"Director") shall immediately make an appropriate investigation, in the
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their complaint on the following arguments: (1) that § 1862(b) was
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority by the Congress; (2) that, even if the statute was constitutional, it did not give
the President the power to enact this type of indirect regulation of
imports; and (3) that the President did not comply with the procedural requirements set forth in the statute.' Plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction to restrain defendants' from enforcing Procourse of which he shall seek information and advice from other appropriate
departments and agencies, to determine the effects on the national security
of imports of the article which is the subject of such request, application,
or motion. If, as a result of such investigation, the Director is of the opinion
that the said article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security, he shall promptly so advise the President, and, unless the President determines that the article is not being imported into the United
States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to
impair the national security as set forth in this section, he shall take such
action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of
such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not so threaten to
impair the national security.

7. Plaintiffs also argued that the program failed to meet the standards of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970), in that an environmental impact statement was not filed before action was taken.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (1970) provides:
(c) For the purpose of this section, the Director and the President shall,
in the light of the requirements of national security and without excluding
other relevant factors, give consideration to domestic production needed for
projected national defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements, existing and anticipated availabilities of
the human resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national defense, the requirements of growth of such
industries and such supplies and services including the investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use
as those affect such industries and the capacity of the United States to meet
national security requirements. In the administration of this section, the
Director and the President shall further recognize the close relation of the
economic welfare of the nation to our national security and shall take into
consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of
individual domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, or other
serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by
excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in
determining whether such weakening of our internal economy may impair
the national security.
9. William F. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury and Administrator of the
Federal Energy Administration.
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clamation 4341, which requires an import license subject to the
payment of fees in order to import oil and petroleum products into
the United States. Defendants contended that plaintiff's plea for
relief was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act," that plaintiffs had
in any case failed to meet the requirements for injunctive relief,"
that the public interest would be harmed by a delay in the implementation of the Presidential Proclamation, that § 1862(b) clearly
delegated to the Executive the authority to take such action, and
that the program was a fee system to support the administrative
structure, rather than a tax system to raise revenue. 12 Plaintiffs

conceded at the outset that the executive decision that action was
required in the interests of the national security was not an issue
subject to judicial review. 3 They challenged only the program instituted as a result of that executive determination. The District
Court for the District of Columbia found jurisdiction 4 and recognized irreparable injury sustained by plaintiffs, but the court accepted defendants' latter three contentions and denied plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction. On appeal to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed and remanded.
When the President deems that importation of any product threatens the national security, he may under § 1862(b) adjust the imports of that article through direct means such as quotas or embargoes, but not through indirect mechanisms such as import license
fees. Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 518 F.2d
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Nov.
4, 1975) (no. 75-382).
Article I, § 8, paragraph 3 of the Constitution gives Congress the
10. 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1970).
11. The four criteria recognized by the District Court as required to grant the
equitable relief of a preliminary injunction are:
(a) a strong showing that plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits of the
case;
(b) irreparable injury;
(c) possibility of harm to others not parties but interested in the proceedings;
(d) public interest.
518 F.2d 1051, 1069 (1975).
12. For discussion of the distinction between a legitimate fee which the Executive may impose to support the program and a tax which only Congress may

constitutionally impose, see notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
13. 518 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1975).
14. The court used 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340 (1970) which provide, respectively,
for federal question jurisdiction and jurisdiction over claims arising under Congressional acts concerning revenue from imports.
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power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
1 Although the sentence may be read as creseveral states . . . . ..
ating two distinct congressional powers, e.g., to regulate commerce
among the states and the power to regulate foreign commerce,
Chief Justice Marshall stated the interpretation that has been
followed since 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden'" when he noted that the
sentence was a single unit that conferred a single power of regulation to the Congress. The word power "must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence."'" Thus, Congress has the same authority to regulate foreign as domestic commerce. The modern
Supreme Court has broadly construed the Commerce Clause to
allow Congress to regulate any activity, foreign or domestic, that
touches commerce in any manner."1 Under the doctrine of separation of powers, given Congress's broad power to regulate commerce, the authority of the executive branch in that area is severely limited. Despite significant congressional authority over foreign commerce, the President possesses power in the field of foreign affairs which is derived from three distinct sources: article II
of the Constitution;' 9 inherent authority based on his position as
leader of a sovereign state; and power delegated from the legislature. Congress, however, can neither delegate its full legislative
powers to the executive branch, nor, generally, delegate authority
giving unfettered discretion to the President."0 The charge of improper delegation of legislative authority arises when Congress has
left too much discretion to the Executive, fails to provide sufficiently clear guidelines to the Executive or administrative agency,
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
18. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 145 (1971) (interstate extortionate credit transactions are subject to regulation under the commerce power);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Congress can regulate production of a
home-consumed crop); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110
(1942) (Congress can regulate the price of milk sold in one state); N.L.R.B. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (production employees guaran-

teed the right to organize collectively). See generally, Recent Developments Affecting the Scope of Executive Power to Regulate ForeignCommerce, 16 B.C. IND.
& CoM. L. REV. 778 (1975).
19, The defendant executive agency did not claim that the regulations at issue

in the instant case were based on art. II, §§ 2, 3 powers of the President.
20. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935). See generally, Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1938-1962 at 89 (Ass'n of Am. Law

Schools ed. 1963).
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or attempts to abdicate its responsibility by delegating its consti21
tutional legislative authority. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
one of the few cases finding an improper delegation of power, the
Supreme Court held that if no policy or standards, express or implied, to guide the President were stated in the delegation by which

to judge whether the President was obeying the congressional will,
then the delegation would be found improper. 22 In subsequent

cases of delegation the Court has upheld very broad grants giving
wide discretion, 2 and broad delegations of authority over international affairs have almost unanimously been upheld." The Court
has followed the reasoning laid down in United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp.,25 where Justice Sutherland noted that in the
field of foreign affairs the rules requiring clear congressional standards and prohibiting extensive delegations of power do not apply
because the President, as sovereign, needs great discretion to deal
with international conflicts and has access to information not
available to Congress. For example, in upholding executive power
under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 to vary import duties by
21. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
22. Notice that the unlawful delegation of authority would have permitted the
executive to prohibit the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of petroleum withdrawn from storage in excess of amounts allowed by state regulation.
Because of the lack of clear standards in the section, the court was unable to
decide whether the purpose of the delegation was to protect domestic resources
and national commerce or to encourage the free flow of foreign commerce. 293
U.S. at 418. Therefore, this is not a case clearly involving executive authority over
foreign affairs.
23. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (the Administrator was given
authority to fix fair and equitable prices to effectuate the policy of the Act.) See
also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Dakota Central
Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163 (1919).
24. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 411 (1928)
(the President can raise or lower import duties based on criteria stated by Congress to equalize differences between costs of domestically and foreign produced
goods); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892) (the President is Congress' agent
and possesses discretion to raise or lower import tariffs); Star-Kist Foods v.

United States, 275 F.2d 472 (Cust. Pat. App. 1959) (regarding Presidential power
to vary import duties, Congress can delegate broad discretion in legislation inherently bearing on foreign affairs). An exception to this general trend is Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), where the Supreme Court held that broad executive
discretion in the granting of passports was an unlawful delegation of Congress'
law-making authority. That case, however, involved the Constitutional right to
travel and is distinguishable from the instant case involving economic regulations, not a First Amendment right.
25. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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as much as fifty per cent, the Court expressly stated that Congress
can give the President broader discretionary power in legislation
relating to his conduct of foreign affairs than to domestic matters,2 6
therefore, restrictions imposed on congressional delegation of duty
are no longer a significant barrier to legislation. 7 The Executive
can also claim some measure of authority based on the inherent
power of that branch. The Steel Seizure caseH is the most comprehensive explication of inherent executive power. President Truman
had directed seizure of the steel industry to avoid a strike which
Truman claimed would have slowed production and had an adverse effect on the national defense. The opinion of the Court noted
merely that the President lacked all authority to act alone in an

area where Congress could have delegated power, thus stating that
in delegable areas there is no inherent executive authority. The
separate opinions tend, however, to affirm some inherent power in
the President, at least where he does not act in a manner incompatible with the will of Congress. 29 The theory of inherent executive
authority was strongly supported in dicta in Curtiss-Wrightwhere
the Court stressed that in the field of foreign affairs the President
need not depend on either an express article II grant or a congressional delegation of power for the authority to act."0 The history of
26. Star-Kist Foods v. United States, 275 F.2d 472, 480 (Cust. Pat. App.
1959).
27. The only cases that found delegations of power to the Executive unconstitutional were A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), and PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1925), which are now 40
years old and are not followed in more recent cases involving congressional delegations of authority, especially in the field of foreign affairs.
28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
29. The concurring opinion by Justices Jackson and Clark divides Presidential authority to act into three distinct situations: when the President acts in
opposition to the will of Congress his power is at its nadir consisting only of
inherent executive authority; when the President acts pursuant to the expressed
or implied will of Congress his power is at its height; and when the President acts
alone without the assent or disagreement of Congress he possesses his own constitutional authority and some undefined concurrent power with Congress. Only
Justices Black, Douglas, and Burton clearly rejected the theory of inherent executive authority. Professor Bernard Schwartz concludes that a majority of the Court
did not deny the theory of inherent executive authority to act to meet emergencies. Schwartz, Constitutional Law 149-50 (1972).
30. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). L. Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1972); Bestor, Separationof Powers in the Domain of ForeignAffairs: The Intent
of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 527 (1974);
Henkin, "A More Effective System" for Foreign Relations: The Constitutional
Framework, 61 VA. L. REv. 751 (1975); Lofgren, United States v.Curtiss-Wright
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the regulation of oil imports, therefore, must be read in light of the
legitimacy of broad legislative delegations and the existence of
some inherent executive power over foreign affairs. 3' Early regula-

tion of oil imports, which began in 1957 with the establishment of
the Voluntary Oil Import Program that set quotas for imports to
different areas of the country and provided for "jawboning" techniques to encourage voluntary reduction of crude oil imports to
meet the quotas, proved unsuccessful because the lack of sanctions
allowed the oil industry to ignore the quotas with impunity.32 Con-

gress recognized, however, that importation of oil in excessive
amounts could cause serious domestic problems because the importation of crude oil and refined oil at low costs threatened to
impair national security by slowing development of domestic production and refining. This recognition led to the establishment of
the Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP) in 1959.3 President
Eisenhower issued Proclamation 3279, pursuant to § 1862(b), 34 requiring that each importer secure a license 3 and establishing absolute import quotas. 3 The two Presidential proclamations at issue
in the instant case were issued pursuant to § 1862(b) and radically
changed the existing system. No. 4210 abolished the quota system
and provided for the issuance of import licenses based on a schedule of license fees. 37 No. 4341 provided for acceleration of the 1973
Export Corp.: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973); Thurow,
PresidentialDiscretion in ForeignAffairs, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 71 (1973).
31. See Metzger, United States Foreign Trade: Past, Present,and Future, 6
VILL. L. REV. 503 (1961).
32. See CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. OIL IMPORT QUOTA
(1970); Schwartz & Kindred, American Regulation of Oil Imports: Law, Policy

and Institutional Responsibility, 5 J.

WORLD TRADE L. 267 (1971); Dam,
Implementation of Import Quotas: The Case of Oil, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1971).

33. The program remained in effect until May 1, 1973, despite some twentyfive amendments to the system. See generally, Note, National Security and Oil
Import Regulation: The License Fee Approach, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 399 (1975); Note,

The Mandatory Oil Import Program:A Review of PresentRegulations and Proposals for Change in the 1970's, 7 Tux. INT'L L.J. 373 (1972); Note, United States
Oil Import Restrictions:A Program in Need of Reform, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &POL.
343 (1970).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970).
35. The country was divided into five districts with absolute quotas set for
each district.
36. The program provided for the Secretary of the Interior to allocate quotas
to importers based on import history and existing refinery capacity. See UNITED
STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, WORLD OIL DEVELOPMENTS AND U.S. IMPORT POLICIES

632 (T.C. Publication 1973).
37. See note 5 supra.
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fee schedules and a supplementary fee per barrel on imported petroleum products and crude oil.3" Recent cases applicable to §
1862(b) and executive action taken pursuant thereto have considered three separate factors: Presidential authority and delegation
of duty; the nature of the license fees; and statutory interpretation.
39 the Customs Court dealt with a Presidential
In Yoshida Int'1
proclamation based on § 1981, the so-called "escape clause" of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, allowing executive action to protect
American business." The court held that the broad clause could
not be read as delegating a significant amount of authority to the
President because an amendment to the Act, § 353,1 expressly

giving the power asserted was rejected by the Senate in 1962.42 The
deletion of § 353, the court found, showed that Congress was unwilling to grant such broad discretionary powers to the President
and was a recognition that such an unrestrained grant might have
been an invalid delegation of legislative authority. 3 In New Eng38.
39.
(rev'd
40.

Id.
Yoshida Int'l Inc. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974);
on other grounds), 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
19 U.S.C. 1981(a)(1) (1970) provides:

After receiving an affirmative finding of the Tariff Commission under
section 1901(b) of this title with respect to an industry, the President may
proclaim such increase in, or imposition of, any duty or other import restriction on the article causing or threatening to cause serious injury to such
industry as he determines to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious
injury to such industry.
41. Section 353 states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may, when he
finds it in the national interest, proclaim with respect to any article imported into the United States-(I) the increase of any existing duty on such
article to such rate as he finds necessary, (2) the imposition of a duty on
such article (if it is not otherwise subject to duty) at such rate as he finds

necessary, and (3) the imposition of such other import restrictions as he
finds necessary. 108 CONG. REC. 19875 (1962).
42. Senator Byrd explained the section as proposing to give unlimited and
undefined power to impose quotas or tariffs to protect the national security. He
called the deleted section, ". . . a sword which could cut two ways: First, one
problem was that there was no procedure prescribed for ascertaining the facts and
second, the other problem was that the Congress did not retain the same opportunity for review as the other sections of the bill provide." 108 CONG. REc. 22182
(1962).
43. 378 F. Supp. at 1166. Equally tenable, however, is the inference that
Congress believed that the proposed change was already incorporated in the existing legislation. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(in statutory interpretation nothing should be inferred from congressional failure
to adopt an amendment).

Spring 1976]

RECENT DECISIONS

land Power" and National Cable45 the Supreme Court distinguished between fees that may be assessed by the Executive to
financially support the program he administers, and taxes that
are solely within the power of Congress to levy. A statute giving
the Executive legitimate legislative power also gives him some
discretion to establish the machinery to use that power. A fee can
thus be assessed to support the administration of the executive
program if it is assessed in proportion to the benefit given to the
specific individual or corporation.46 The fee must be related to the
benefits conferred rather than to the ability to pay or to a desire
to raise revenue which constitutionally is the power of Congress.
In deciding what powers § 1862(b) or any other statutory provision
confers on the President the courts must construe the statutory
language. The plain meaning of a statute is a significant factor in
its interpretation 7 but is subject to the overriding requirement
that all sources of the statute be considered." The legislative history of § 1862(b), at the time of the original passage" and at reenactment, is ambiguous as to whether Congress limited the section to direct executive action or empowered the President to use
the gamut of regulatory measures, direct and indirect."0 Section
44. F.P.C. v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974).
45. Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n., Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
46. A tax can be arbitrarily imposed without regard to the benefits given, but
the Court held that a fee must be related to the benefits bestowed. 415 U.S. at
341. The revenue to be generated by the license fee program was eventually
expected to be $4.8 billion dollars annually.
47. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.D.C. 1973).
48. "The 'plain meaning' doctrine has always been subservient to a truly
discernible legislative purpose however discerned." Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton,
479 F.2d 842, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Courts should consider congressional committee reports, statements of sponsors, statements made on the floor of Congress, and
pronouncements of later Congresses, Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Farr,
383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967); and also all sources of the legislation and expressed
or implied policies underlying the legislation, Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.D.C. 1973).
49. S. REP. No. 232, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955). The Senate Committee
report on § 1862(b) stated, "the President, if he finds a threat to the national
security exists, shall take whatever action is necessary to adjust imports to a level
that will not threaten to impair the national security."

50. Senator Byrd stated, "[I]t simply leaves to the President the power, in
his discretion, to impose a quota or to reduce the imports." 101 CONG. REc. 5297
(1955). Senator Millikin stated that the section "grants to the President authority
to take whatever action he deems necessary to adjust imports if they should
threaten to impair the national security. He may use tariffs, quotas, import taxes,
or other methods of import restriction." Id. at 5299. See also Id. at 5288 (statement of Senator Bennett); H.R. REP No. 745, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955).
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1862(b), in an attempt to give the President appropriate authority
to deal with continuing problems of domestic industry and national security caused by overdependence on foreign oil, raises the
persistent problems of delegation of power to the Executive by the
legislature and the extent of inherent executive authority to deal
with foreign affairs.
The instant court based its decision on three factors: that, given

the clearly-defined manner in which Congress generally delegates
authority over foreign commerce, a broad construction of § 1862(b)
allowing direct and indirect controls would be an anomalous departure from tradition; that the legislative history of the section,
at its origination in 1955 and at its re-enactment in 1962, supports
a narrow reading of the statute; and that recent Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the Trade Expansion Act and the distinction between fees and taxes fail to support the government's liberal
construction of the statute as giving the President the authority
claimed. The court noted first that the majority of trade provisions51
delegating power to the Executive have been narrow and explicit.
Considering that Congress has clearly occupied the field of trade
regulation and that to be constitutional a delegation must be narrow and specific, the court stated that the intent of Congress would
be scrutinized to ascertain the precise extent of the delegation. The
court found the legislative history, especially the 1955 floor debate,
a significant key to the intent of the statute.2 The court referred
to Yoshida Int'l and agreed that the rejection by Congress of the
proposed amendment 3 indicated that Congress did not intend to
confer upon the Executive the authority that defendants claimed
in defending the Presidential proclamations. The court did not
find congressional ratification in its failure to react to the proclamations." Turning to defendants' arguments, the court agreed
that an executive determination that action must be taken to
protect the national security was not reviewable by the courts.5
51. The instant court cited several examples of trade provisions where the
congressional delegations of authority have been narrow and explicit. See 19
U.S.C. § 1901, 1981 (injuries to domestic industry); 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (modification of duties); 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251, 2253 (import relief for domestic injuries).
52. See S. REP. No. 232, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955); 101 CONG. REc. 5288,
5292, 5299, 5572, 5584 (1955).
53. See § 353, the rejected amendment to the Trade Expansion Act note 41

and accompanying text supra.
54. Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 518 F.2d 1051, 1060 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
55. The District Court for the District of Columbia observed, "... plaintiffs
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However, the particular action taken was subject to review to determine whether it was within the statutory grant of authority and
whether the statute itself was a legitimate constitutional delegation. The court in the instant case did not reach the constitutional
question of delegation, finding that Congress had not delegated the
power asserted by defendants." The court then examined defendants' final contention that the surcharges levied by the challenged proclamations were not taxes or tariffs, which could only be
imposed by Congress or through a proper delegation of authority,
but rather were fees imposed to offset the administrative costs of
the program. The court concluded that a fee must be related to the
benefit conferred, as in payment for a license which grants privileges and benefits to its owner.57 The court characterized the import surcharges in the instant case as duties for the purpose of
regulating imports and raising revenue rather than fees, and as a
regulatory measure the license fees imposed upon plaintiffs constituted an indirect means of controlling imports not authorized by
§ 1862(b). The court concluded that while the President was not
authorized to regulate oil imports to protect national security by
indirect methods, he could either have imposed direct controls,
e.g., quotas or an embargo, or sought authorization from Congress
to impose indirect controls.
The dissent looked to the plain meaning of the statute and noted
that the legislative histories of the section and the rejected amendment were ambiguous and concluded that the statute appeared to
delegate broad power to the President. The dissent argued that the
statute does not forbid the President to do indirectly what he can
do directly and the majority's reading of the statute creates a
distinction without a difference. The dissent concluded that in the
area of foreign commerce Congress can delegate broad discretion
to the Executive without overstepping constitutional limitations
regarding delegation of legislative authority.
have conceded that the President's determination that his program is required
in the interests of national security is a finding which is not subject to judicial
review." 518 F.2d 1051, 1065 (1975). Therefore, that question was not at issue at
the Circuit Court level.
56.

518 F.2d at 1062. That question was specifically reserved:

"...

we do not

say that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate, accompanied by an intelligible standard, such authority to the President; we merely find that they have not
done so by this statute."
57. See the discussion of fees as decided by the Supreme Court in Nat'l Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) and FPCv. New England
Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974), note 46 supra and accompanying text.

458

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9:447

The instant case, dealing with the issue of whether the Executive
can apply indirect as well as direct means to control the importation of oil into the United States when he deems that excessive
importation is or could be detrimental to national security, grows
out of long attempts by Congress and the President to reduce
American overdependence on foreign oil. The remaining question,
specifically reserved by the instant court, is whether Congress can
constitutionally delegate the power to the President to control
imports indirectly, by a system of license fees instead of quotas or
by an embargo. The majority decision implies that a clear delegation supported by guidelines and unequivocal legislative history
would be a proper one. In the instant situation, the court correctly
looked beyond the plain meaning of the statute, but four factors
mandate against the court's construction of the section. First, the
legislative history of § 1862(b) is ambiguous both at the time of
passage of the section 8 and at the time of its re-enactment. 9 Secondly, although the court relies heavily on the Yoshida case,"0 that
decision was based on a section whose purpose was to support
American business rather than to protect national security;"1 and
the effect of the Senate's failure to enact § 353 supports the theory
that Congress believed that the broad power to adjust imports
given in § 353 was contained in the existing law as well as it supports the court's reasoning that Congress did not want to make a
broad grant of authority. Thirdly, the court, in stating that delega62
tions must be clear and circumscribed, relied on old decisions
58.

Senate Committee Report and statements from the floor, supra notes 41,

42, 49, 50, 52.
59. Id.

60. Supra note 39. See Note, United States Trade Law at the Crossroads, 8
N,Y,U,J, INT'L L. & POL. 63 (1975); Note, Yoshida Int'l v. United States: Was

the 1971 Import Surcharge Legally Imposed?, 73 MICH. L. REv. 952 (1975).
61. The disputed section in Yoshida Int'l was § 1981(a)(1) which deals with
Presidential power to take action to adjust imports when the importation of an
article impairs or threatens to impair the welfare of domestic business. This can
be contrasted with § 1862(b) of the same act which allows the President to adjust
imports to protect the national security. While the term national security is
nowhere defined in the Act, § 1862(b) clearly deals with foreign affairs. Thus, the
Executive can claim broader authority on his own, as well as receive more delegations from the Congress, while § 1981(a)(1) arguably deals with domestic affairs
and any delegation to the Executive would have to be more clear and circumscribed. It is unwise to assume that everything the Customs Court said about §
1981(a)(1) applies to § 1862(b).
62. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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that have been consistently undermined by judicial affirmation of
broad and discretionary delegati6ns 3 Finally, and most significantly, the instant case involves a delegation of power not over
national but over foreign affairs. In cases involving such delegations the Supreme Court has almost universally upheld practically
unfettered authority given to the Executive on the theory that the
President must have discretion as the head of a sovereign state 4
or on the Curtiss-Wright theory of inherent power over foreign
affairs. Because the President did not act contrary to the expressed
will of Congress and because the instant case involves international rather than domestic affairs, the Steel Seizure case provides
support for the District Court's decision to uphold the license fees.
Moreover, the generally recognized need to provide for a practical
and flexible program to protect domestic industry and to alleviate
the national security problems inherent in the overdependence on
foreign oil imports compels a liberal construction of § 1862(b) in
line with other cases dealing with delegation of authority to the
President to deal with foreign affairs.
Susan Beth Farmer
63.

Cases cited supra notes 9-11.

64. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).

